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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the current model of European Union conditionality toward the
Western Balkans, which based on a dual approach through the Stabilization and Association
Process (SAP). Through SAP, the European Union (EU) is trying to stabilize the Western
Balkans, while at the same time associating them with EU policies and supporting them in taking
over the EU acquis. My hypothesis is that in order to promote democracy and the rule of law, the
EU’s policy of stabilizing and integrating should be reformed to better strengthen and clarify
conditionality.
In order to test my hypothesis, I focused on the three Western Balkan countries, Croatia,
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were chosen because each represented a different
stage of accession; they share a geographical footprint; and many historical experiences. I first
discussed problems associated with each country’s transition to democracy. I looked at the
justice and home affairs sector of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Within that
I assessed whether the measures to address corruption and minority rights and refugees have
been effective.
The results of my tests indicate that despite the financial assistance the EU has given
towards the Western Balkans, the countries have a long way to go to improving democracy and
the rule of law. Conditions have not worsened but they have not improved. The EU can get its
enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans back on track by strengthening its conditionality
and only accepting members when they are politically and technically ready to become EU
member states.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
More than twenty years after declaring its independence from the former Yugoslavia,
Croatia took a historic step by signing the European Accession Treaty on December 9, 2011,
making it the twenty-eighth member of the European Union (EU), as of mid 2013. Croatia will
become the EU’s second ex-Yugoslav member, after Slovenia.1
Further pushing Croatia towards the EU, on January 22, 2012, Croatians voted in favor of
EU membership in a national referendum. Voters were asked a simple question, “Do you support
the Republic of Croatia’s membership of the European Union?”2 Sixty-five percent voted in
favor of membership versus thirty-three percent against.3 Praising the result, European
Commission president José Barroso, and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy,
issued a press statement calling the upcoming accession of Croatia a “positive outcome.”4 “The
upcoming accession of Croatia sends a clear signal to the whole region of South Eastern Europe.
It shows that through political courage and determined reforms, EU membership is within
reach,” they said.5
While this new development might paint European accession in a rosy light, all is not
quiet on the Western Front. Voter turnout in the referendum was about forty-four percent.6
Minister of Parliament (MP) Ruza Tomasic said, “We are not ready for the European Union. We
should have improved our economy, increased our exports, and only join then. Our economy is

1

"Croatia Signs Treaty to Join EU in Middle of 2013." BBC News. BBC, 9 Dec. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16106982>
2
"Croatia EU Referendum: Voters Back Membership." BBC News. BBC, 22 Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16670298>
3
Ibid.
4
Joint Statement of European Commission President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy on the
Outcome of the EU Accession Referendum in Croatia. EUROPA. 22 Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/29&format=HTML&ag>
5
Ibid.
6
"Croatia Votes for EU Membership." Euronews. 22 Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.euronews.com/2012/01/22/croatia-votes-for-eu-membership>
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in very bad condition. We don’t have a single real national bank. Our exports are abysmal. We
are on our knees.”7 While these words are stark, the numbers confirm the statements of Ms.
Tomasic and others in the “No” camp. Croatia’s economy is sluggish, with a growth rate of just
0.4 percent and a debt higher than its income at 102 percent of its GDP as of January 2012.8 The
unemployment rate is around eighteen percent and the average salary is equivalent to €715 or
$944.9 Given these alarming numbers, it remains to be seen whether Croatians will still accept
restructuring willingly.
Croatia’s accession to the EU represents the dilemma of European enlargement in the
Western Balkans.10 On the one hand, enlargement will bring about better market access, more
trade and investment opportunities, and security. The EU promises to transform the Western
Balkans into stable, self sufficient democracies, at peace with themselves and their neighbors,
with market economies and rule of law.11 On the other hand, should the Western Balkans join a
community in the midst of severe economic problems? The EU’s policy towards the Balkans has
had mixed results. From Greece’s name dispute with Macedonia to European divisions over
recognizing Kosovo, to arguments over whether Serbia is cooperating with the Hague Tribunal,
the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans is in disarray.12

7

"Croatia's EU Leap." Euronews. 23 Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.euronews.com/2012/01/23/croatia-s-eu-leap>
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
The Balkan Peninsula is best defined as an area of southeastern Europe surrounded by water on three sides: the
Adriatic Sea to the west, the Mediterranean Sea to the South and the Black Sea to the east. Its northern boundary is
given as the Danube, Sava, and Kupa rivers. The countries that fall within this area are: Albania, Bosnia, and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Montenegro.
Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia are significantly located on the peninsula and are considered part of the Balkans. For
this thesis, we will be looking at the Western Balkan countries. The European Commission defines the Western
Balkans as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo.
11
AroldaElbasani. "EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Strategies of Borrowing and Investing." Journal of
Southern Europe and the Balkans 10.3 (2008): 293-307 p. 293
12
Kristof Bender, and Gearld Knaus. High Soon in Slovenia-a Referendum and the Future of Balkan Enlargement.
European Stability Initiative, 2010.
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The European Economic Community Treaty (EEC) or the Treaty of Rome, signed in
1957, evoked the aim “of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.”13 It
omitted, however, that becoming a closer union on the inside simultaneously implies becoming a
closed union on the outside. This is the dilemma of European integration, which contains both
dimensions of inclusion and exclusion.
If a country wants to join the European Union, it must fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria.
The criteria were drawn up in 1993 for the newly independent Central and Eastern European
countries whose transition to democracy and capitalism became synonymous with transition to
EU membership.14 Countries must meet certain political and economic preconditions, have to be
able to adopt the full body of EU law, and need to obtain the EU’s political consent to initiate the
accession process.15 The fundamental precondition for membership, however, is a “European
identity.” As the Treaty on the European Union states: “Any European State […] may apply to
become a member of the Union.”16
If the EU does not recognize the interested country as “European,” it does not need to
apply any other criteria, as was the case when it rejected Morocco’s application in 1987.17 While
there is no dispute that the Western Balkans are in Europe, they are a hard nut for the EU to
crack. Not only do the countries of the region need to undergo the triple transition of
democratization, marketization, and state consolidation, which the Central and Eastern European

13

The Treaty of Rome. EUROPA. Web. 25 Apr. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf>
14
Desmond Dinan. "Beyond the EU's Borders." Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. 4th
ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011. 483-527. p.485
15
Marcel Viëtor. "Putting the Neighborhood on the Map: Ever Closer, Ever Closed? Enlargement, Neighborhood,
and the Question of "European Identity." Ed. Almut Möller. DGAP Analyse: Crossing Borders: Rethinking the
European Union's Neighborhood Policies 2 (2011): 11-15. p. 11
16
Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union. EUROPA. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002M/htm/C_2002325EN.000501.html#anArt59>.
17
Marcel Viëtor. "Putting the Neighborhood on the Map: Ever Closer, Ever Closed? Enlargement, Neighborhood,
and the Question of "European Identity p. 11
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Countries (CEE) faced following the changes in 1989, they also face the legacy of wars of the
1990s.18 The breakup of Yugoslavia remains a heavy burden upon relations between the
successor states and has required sustained state and nation-building efforts throughout the
region.
This thesis will analyze the current European model, which is based on a dual approach
through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). SAP has three aims:
1. Stabilizing the countries and encouraging their swift transition to a market economy;
2. Promoting regional cooperation;
3. Eventual membership of the EU.19
Through SAP, the EU is trying to stabilize the Western Balkans, while at the same time
associating them with EU policies and supporting them in taking over the EU acquis. This
approach draws not only on the ordinary toolkit of enlargement policy, but makes use of a series
of instruments pertaining to foreign policy as personified in the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and its operational arm, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).20
I will argue that the SAP or dual approach model of stabilizing and integrating to
promote democracy and the rule of law in the case of the Western Balkans is ineffective. The
model needs to be clearer and more consistent. The EU must do a better job of increasing the
internal coherence of its policies in the region. They must better communicate the conditions and
benefits of accession by having a consistent message, clarifying the criteria of accession. While

18

Natasha Wunsch. "Reaching Its Limits? EU Enlargement Policy in the Western Balkans." Ed. Almut
Möller. DGAP Analyse: Crossing Borders: Rethinking the European Union's Neighborhood Policies 2: 25-29. p. 25
19
"The Stabilization and Association Process." European Commission-Enlargement. EUROPA, 20 Apr. 2012. Web.
15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/ind
ex_en.htm>
20
Natasha Wunsch. "Reaching Its Limits? EU Enlargement Policy in the Western Balkans p. 25
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the future of the Balkans and the rest of Europe is interdependent, the current model is
unproductive and producing very sluggish results.
The EU’s credibility as an international actor depends to some degree on its success in
the Western Balkans because the Western Balkan enlargement is a major test case for EU foreign
policy. In no other region in Europe are the incentives for transformation so significant. Thus, the
failure to successfully integrate all the Western Balkan States would have an impact and would
damage the EU’s claim to act as a transformative power in its neighborhood. This thesis aims to
provide policymakers, practitioners, and the public with fresh ideas on how the Western Balkans
can best integrate into the EU.
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Chapter 2: Research Design
My hypothesis is that in order to promote democracy and the rule of law, the European
Union policy of stabilizing and integrating should be reformed to better strengthen and clarify
conditionality.
I plan to apply this hypothesis to the specific case of the Western Balkans, that is Croatia,
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These three cases have been chosen because each
represents a different stage of accession. Croatia signed its Accession Treaty on December 9,
2012 with the European Council.1 Subject to ratification of the Treaty by Croatia and all Member
States, Croatia will become an EU Member State on July 1, 2013.2 Serbia became an EU
candidate country on March 1, 2012 after the European Council endorsed their conclusions of
February 28, 2012 on the Enlargement and the Stabilization and Association Process.3 Bosnia
and Herzegovina is still progressing towards becoming a candidate country but its deteriorating
political situation makes Bosnia and Herzegovina’s enlargement bid uncertain.4 In addition, all
three states share a geographical footprint and many historical experiences. They were all
principal actors in the wars in Yugoslavia and faced/face challenges stemming from efforts to
change political attitudes and chart a new course towards a more productive future.5
I will focus on the transition to democracy as well as the justice and home affairs sector
of the Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which is a particular element, in
measuring the effectiveness of EU methods. The IPA has five components: Transition Assistance
1

General Secretariat of the Council. European Council-9 December 2011-conclusions. EUROPA, 25 Jan. 2012.
Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126714.pdf> p. 5
2
Ibid. p. 5
3
General Secretariat of the Council. European Council-1/2 March-Conclusions. EUROPA, 28 Mar. 2012. Web. 15
Mar. 2012. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/128520.pdf>.
4
Report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Activities of the
European Union Military Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rep. no. S/2011/717. United Nations. Web. 15 Mar.
2012. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/592/73/PDF/N1159273.pdf?OpenElement> p. 3
5
Richard P Farkas. Democratization in the Balkans: Prescription for a Badly Scarred Body Politic. Boston:
Northeastern UP, 2007. p.4
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and Institution Building, Cross-Border Cooperation, Regional Development, Human Resources
Development, and Rural Development. However, in the interest of time, I will be looking closely
at only the first component which is used to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of
law. Within this first component, there are seven sectoral foci. They are: justice and home affairs
and fundamental rights; public administration reform; environment and climate change;
transports; private sector development; social development; and agriculture and rural
developments. Again in the interest of time, I will be looking only at the justice and home affairs
sector within that I will also assess whether the measures undertaken to address corruption and
minority rights and refugees have been effective, that is whether the step by step goals are being
met. By that I mean whether there have been positive changes in the areas of corruption and
minority rights and refugees.
Before going into the literature relevant to this study, it is important to define two terms,
“Europeanization” and “democracy.”
Europeanization
Throughout modern history, Europeanization has taken on different meanings. It has
referred to the process of socialization or the internalization of EU norms.6 It is used in this way
by historians and anthropologists to describe the export of cultural norms and patterns. Today,
Europeanization is associated with the domestic adaption to the pressures resulting directly or
indirectly from EU membership. It is used to show how public administrative institutions have
adapted to the obligations of EU membership.7

6

Adrienne Héritier. "Europeanization Research East and West: A Comparative Assessment."The Europeanization of
Central and Eastern Europe. Ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2005. p.
202
7
Ibid. p. 202
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Many researchers have used Europeanization in a variety of ways. A common usage was
first provided by Robert Ladrech in his 1994 article “The Europeanization of Domestic Politics
and Institutions: the Case of France.”8 He saw Europeanization as a process reorienting the
direction and shape of politics to the degree that the European Community’s political and
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy
making.9 This concept focuses on how actors redefine their interests and behavior to meet the
rules, norms, and logic of EU membership.
Looking at the institutional sphere, Caporaso, Cowles, and Risse suggest that
Europeanization should be a dual product of adaptational pressures resulting from varying
goodness of fit between EU and national institutions and policies and domestic intervening
variables, including the number of veto points and the organizational and political cultures
embedded in existing national institutions.10 Their focus is on cross-level political interactions.
In contrast, Knills and Lehmkuhl focus on a top-down approach. Each mechanism
involves policy constraints emanating from the European level that may yield domestic
institutional changes.11 The first mechanism takes the form of “positive integration” and is found
when EU obligations advise an institutional model to which domestic arrangements have to be
adopted, with little national discretion.12 In this context, Europeanization rests on institutional
goodness of fit between domestic and European arrangements.13 The second mechanism is called
“negative integration” and occurs when EU legislation changes the domestic rules of the game.
8

Robert Ladrech. "The Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France." Journal of
Common Market Studies 32.1 (1994): 69-88. p. 69
9
Ibid. p. 69
10
Mark A Pollack. "Theorizing EU Policy-Making." Policy-making in the European Union. Ed. Helen Wallace,
Mark A. Pollack, and Alasdair R. Young. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. 15-44 p. 37
11
Kevin Featherstone. "Introduction: In the Name of "Europe"" The Politics of Europeanization. Ed. Kevin
Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. 3-26 p. 14
12
Christopher Knill, and Dirk Lehmkuhl. "How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of
Europeanization." European Integration Online Papers 3.7 (1999) p. 3
13
Featherstone, Kevin. "Introduction: In the Name of "Europe" p. 14
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Finally, the third mechanism is whether European policy changes the beliefs and expectations of
domestic actors, who in turn may change their preferences and strategies.14
For this thesis, I define Europeanization as a process in which states adapt to EU rules for
enlargement. When I refer to “states,” I denote the political-institutional structures into which
EU rules are integrated. “Governments” are the actors that adopt the EU rules. The rules cover a
broad range of issues and structures, such as regulation and distribution in specific policy areas,
political and administrative processes, and the creation and competences of state and sub-state
organizations.15 Government works to institutionalize and implement EU rules at the domestic
level.
Democracy
The term “democracy” is something we hear a lot but often do not usually clarify. In the
European Union Treaty, Article 6 states, “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States.”16 But what actually is “democracy”?
According to James Coporaso, democracy is a set of procedures about how collective
decisions are taken. Collective decisions are made by all the relevant actors.17 In this definition,
democracy means that people choose those who make the decisions and the procedures by which
these decisions are made.
Seymour Martin Lipset defines democracy as a “political system which provides regular
constitutional opportunities for changing government officials… [and] permits the largest

14

Chrisstopher Knill, and Dirk Lehmkuhl. "How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization." P. 3
Frank Schimmelfennig, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and
Eastern Europe." The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich
Sedelmeier. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2005. 1-28. p. 7
16
Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union. EUROPA
17
James A Caporaso. The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000. p. 43
15
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possible part of the population to influence decisions through their ability to choose among
alternative contenders for political office.”18 Samuel Huntington defines democracy as the extent
to which collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in
which candidates freely compete for votes and the entire adult population is eligible to vote.19
For Charles Beitz, democracy is conceived as “a kind of rivalry for control over the state’s
policy-making apparatus, with an electoral mechanism at its center in which all citizens are
entitled to participate…The generic idea of democracy is indeterminate about these matters, but
because not all the possibilities are equally acceptable, some criterion is needed for selecting
among them.20 Finally, Elmer Schattschnedier defines democracy as a “competitive political
system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in
such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process.”21
In addition to defining democracy in terms of elections and representation, there are other
definitions that look at democracy through the specter of governance. Governance in its most
fundamental sense implies the capacity of a society to develop some means of making and
implementing collective choices. The logic of the governance concept is that an effective society
requires some set of mechanisms for identifying common problems, deciding upon goals, and
then designing and implementing the means to achieve those purposes.22 One aspect of
governance is good governance, which has eight major characteristics. Good governance is
participatory, consensus orientated, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient,

18

Seymour Martin Lipset. Political Man. London: Mercury, 1963 p. 71
Samuel P Huntington. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of
Oklahoma, 1991. p. 7
20
Andreas Follesdal, and Simon Hix. "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and
Moravcsik." Journal of Common Market Studies 44.3 (2006): 533-62. p. 547
21
Ibid. p. 547
22
B. Guy Peters, and Jon Pierre. "Governance Approaches." European Integration Theory. By Antje Wiener and
Thomas Diez. Second ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 91-104 p. 92
19
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equitable and inclusive and inclusive, and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is
minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account in decision-making, and responsive to
the present and future needs of society.23
Kaufmann defines good governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority
in a country is exercised.”24 This includes; a process by which governments are selected,
monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic
and social interactions among them.25
Huther and Shah define good governance as a “multifaceted concept encompassing all
aspects of the exercise of authority though formal and informal institutions in the management of
the resource endowment of a state. The quality of governance is thus determined by the impact
of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens.”26
Finally, the World Bank defines good governance as the manner in which power is
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources.27
In this thesis I will define democracy broadly as a political system that focuses on
effective and accountable institutions, the electoral process, representation, and responsible
structures of government, in order to ensure an open and legitimate relationship between the state
and its citizens.

23

"What Is Good Governance?" United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. United
Nations. Web. 1 May 2012. <http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp>.
24
Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell. "What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government
Institutions." Governance 21.2 (2008): 165-90. p. 168
25
Ibid. p. 168
26
Ibid. p. 169
27
Weiss, Thomas G. "Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual
Challenges." Third World Quarterly 21.5 (2000): 795-814. p. 797
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Integration Theory
In explaining European enlargement, the main explanatory framework is integration
theory. Integration theory has evolved over time. In the 1940s and 1950s, the prominent theories
were federalism and functionalism. Following World War II, two paths towards European
integration were laid out; one an integrated European federal union modeled on the United States
(federalism); the other international functional cooperation, in which states would build
foundations for peace and security by cooperating with one another (functionalism).28 Building
on the tenets of functionalism, in the 1960s to the 1980s, neofunctionalists and
intergovernmentalists argued that what drove functional cooperation was key interest groups
which favored integration and governments that pursued national interests.29 Since the 1990s, a
new crop of theories have emerged, including multilevel governance and constructivism. For
each theory, I will explain their main arguments and theorists, and how it helps explain European
enlargement over time.
Federalism has its roots in the Latin term foedus, meaning covenant. 30 It is based on the
idea that you can bring together previously separate, autonomous, or independent entities into a
union whose purpose is to recognize, preserve, and accommodate distinct interests, identities,
and cultures. The meaning of foedus constituted the first serious challenge to the famous French
philosopher, Jean Bodin, and his conception of the state in his 1576 work, “Les Six Livres de la
Republique.”31 Bodin believed in the notion of an independent sovereign state as centralized,
absolute, and indivisible with a supreme power resident (king) answerable only to God and
28

Roy H Ginsberg. Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration. 2nd ed. New
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010 p. 65
29
Ibid. p. 65
30
"Foedus." Babylon.com. Latin-English Online Dictionary. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.babylon.com/define/112/Latin-Dictionary.html>
31
Micheal Burgess. "Federalism." European Integration Theory: Second Edition. By Antje Wiener and Thomas
Diez. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. p. 27
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natural law. In addition, according to Baruch Spinoza, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant,
and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, all states are legally equal, that is all states have the same
juridical status.32
The Bodinian model of the state was first challenged by German Calvinist intellectual
and political magistrate Johannes Althusius, in his 1603 work, “Politica Methodice Digesta
(known as the Politics).33 It articulated a set of federal principles as the basis for the modern
state. Althusius is seen as the father of modern federalism.
In the context of the EU, federalism promotes the idea of a voluntary union of states and
people that is binding upon its members and rooted in mutual respect, recognition, reciprocity,
tolerance, consent, and equality.34 Its shape and structure are determined by the declared goals of
the covenant and the historical circumstances that created it. Since integration, not assimilation,
is the main goal of the EU, it was founded on both self and shared rule.35
The modern origins of the European federalist movement are to be found in the threat of
war and the practical experience of World War II. One of the most prominent federalists was
Altierto Spinelli. Spinelli’s strategy for a European Federation called for creating political
institutions that would be quickly translated into a constitution. His argument can be boiled down
to three themes. First, he believed in an autonomous European federation. The federation must
not be a political party but rather it should be an organization aimed at uniting all supporters of a
European federation regardless of their political beliefs or social background. The organization
must be supranational in nature so as to instill loyalty in its supporters and enable them to

32

Patrick Riley. "The Origins of Federal Theory in International Relations Ideas." Polity 7.1 (1973): 87-121. JSTOR.
Web. 22 Apr. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234183> p. 105
33
Micheal Burgess. "Federalism.” p. 28
34
Ibid. p. 30
35
Ibid. p. 30

17
organize political action at a European level.36 Finally, the movement must have a direct
influence on public opinion, outside of national electoral campaigns, which would help them
exert pressure on the European policies of governments.
The second theme of Spinelli’s strategy was the concept of a European constituent
assembly. He believed that the biggest obstacle to the federation movement was the European
governments themselves, which were afraid to give up their power. European institutions, he
argued, cannot bring about federal solutions because national governments will try to maintain
absolute sovereignty at the expense of effective unification. 37 A constituent assembly, composed
of people representing public opinion, would be more favorable toward federal institutions for
three reasons. First, if the majority of the public supports unification, their representatives have
to take this into account. Second, the political parties would have an international orientation and
would thus support the creation of transnational groups within a European assembly working
together to strengthen pro-European attitudes. Finally, those representing public opinion would
not hold positions of power which are directly dependent on the continuance of absolute national
sovereignty.38
Spinelli’s model for a constituent assembly was the United States Constitution. The
Philadelphia Convention, which framed the Constitution, contains three elements that Spinelli
says should be used for a creation of a European Constitution. First, the governments of
individual states should have the responsibility for starting the process by giving the convention
authority, but afterward should refrain from interfering in its deliberations. Second, the
convention must act by majority vote. Third, the ratification of the Constitution should be
36

Sergio Pistone. "Altiero Spinelli and the Strategy for the United States of Europe." The European Union Readings
on the Theory and Practice of European Integration. Ed. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb. Third ed. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. 91-98 p. 94
37
Ibid. p. 95
38
Ibid. p. 95
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entrusted to the appropriate constitutional organs of individual states, and come into force once
ratified by a majority of them.39
From a federalist perspective, enlargement would create a problem for a federal Europe.
The largest concern would be the preservation of unity and diversity in both European
institutions and policies. Federalists argue that the EU would have to accommodate all of the
applicants without damaging the already agreed upon norms and rules within the EU.40
In contrast to federalists, functionalists believe that technical cooperation among states
raises human welfare and enhances world peace. National divisions become less important
relative to the work of international functional bodies. Two of the most prominent theorists of
functionalism are Jean Monnet and David Mitrany.
Jean Monnet has been referred to as the “father of Europe.”41 He convinced French
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, to propose the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
and became its president from 1951 to 1955. He also led the Europe-wide Action Committee of a
United States of Europe until 1975.42 Monnet argued that a political strategy of small, concrete,
economic steps would culminate in a federal Europe. He believed that states should adopt
common rules governing their behavior and create common institutions to apply these rules.43
The ECSC perfectly expressed these small economic steps.
David Mitrany published “A Working Peace System” in 1943, which introduced the
theory of functionalism. In his study he rejected classical power politics and federalist visions in
favor of the notion of a working peace system, in which specific areas of human activity,
39
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important to welfare, would be organized internationally and managed by experts.44 Rather than
giving up their sovereignty, Mitrany argued that states should share it.45 Functional integration
would be rational, pragmatic, technocratic, and flexible. It would blur national and international,
public and private, and political and nonpolitical distinctions.46
Federalists such as Spinelli criticized functionalism for its belief that one can integrate
selected sectors of national activity without a federalist constitutional framework. They argued
that by refusing to start with a supranational authority, the principle of a national veto would be
retained. Thus, European institutions would be deprived of their ability to overcome special
interests that arise from unrestrained national sovereignty.47 In addition, chaos and inefficiency
would be a product of a lack of common management of the interdependent economies of
modern states.
An updated form of functionalism, neofunctionalism, was formulated in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, mainly through the work of Ernest Haas and Leon Lindberg in response to the
creation of the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC). It finds its intellectual
roots at the juncture between functionalists, federalists, and communication theories, while
drawing indirectly upon the “group theorists” of American politics.48 Neofunctionalism differs
from functionalism because while functionalists hold that form, scope, and the purpose of an
organization is determined by the task it was designed to fulfill, neofunctionalists attach
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considerable importance to the autonomous influence of supranational institutions and the
emergence of organized interests.49
Neofunctionalism gave no single authoritative definition of integration. Both Haas and
Lindberg argued that integration is a process as opposed to an outcome and involves the creation
and role expansion of regional institutions.50 In addition, they both stressed change in
expectations and activities on the part of participating actors. While Lindberg limited his study to
the EEC, Haas based his analysis on the ECSC, but extended his conclusions to both the EEC
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).51 In his 1958 book, “The Uniting
of Europe” Haas defined integration as:
The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end
result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed
over the pre-existing ones.52
Lindberg in his 1963 book “The Political Dynamics of European Integration” defines
integration slightly differently from Haas:
The process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key
domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or
to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and the process whereby
political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and
political activities to a new center.53
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Lindberg’s definition can be seen as more cautious than that of Haas. Unlike Haas, he
does not suggest any endpoint for the integration process. Lindberg also suggested that political
actors only shift their expectations and not their loyalties to a new centre.54
There are five main assumptions of neofunctionalists about the dynamics of
Europeanization. The first is that actors are rational and self-interested and have the capacity to
learn and change their preferences. This change of expectations, activities, and loyalties are
motivated by the actors’ interests.55 They are not constant, however, and are likely to change
during the integration process as actors learn from the benefits of regional policies and from
experiences in decision-making. For example, Haas argued that membership in the ECSC altered
the way that interest groups and, later, member governments, perceived their interests.56
Second, once institutions are established, they can take a life on their own and
progressively escape the control of their creators. Because they want to increase their own
power, employees of regional institutions become agents of further integration by influencing the
perception of a participating government’s interest.57
Third, most political actors are unable to engage in long-term purposive behavior because
they are driven by the unintended consequences of previous decisions.58 Decisions are
undertaken with little knowledge of their consequences and decision makers are under constant
pressure of deadlines. Fourth, neofunctionalists reject the realist notion that all actions between
actors are zero-sum in nature. Exchanges are better described as positive-sum games under a
supranational style of decision-making. States refrain from vetoing proposals and instead seek to
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compromise.59 Fifth, neofunctionalists believe that interdependencies between whole economies
and their productive sectors tend to foster integration.
All five of these assumptions are summed up in the notion of spillover. Haas describes
spillover as a process in which the integration of one sector leads to the pushing of states to
integrate into other sectors.60. The spillover process can be split into two key components, the
sectoral spillover and political spillover. The sectoral spillover involves the expansion of
integrative activities from one sector to another, for example, moving from coal and steel to
agriculture. 61 Political spillover means increasing the politicization of sectoral activities, for
example, when the coordination of monetary policies was replaced by a more centralized system
of governance.62
Neofunctionalist theory has been criticized on a number of premises. First, it has been
criticized as being too grand in its theoretical assumptions. It cannot provide a general theory of
regional integration in all settings, especially of its origins.63 Second, liberal interdependence
theorists such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have questioned neofunctionalists’ assertion
that spillover is inevitable as well as their dependence on economic determinism. More
economically minded critics observe that the concept of spillover is connected to the belief that
economic growth would continue unabated in the capitalist world, and all member states would
benefit more-or-less equally.64 Finally, neofunctionalists have been criticized for their lack of
attention to domestic political processes and structures. According to Hansen and George, they
underestimated the role of national leadership by assuming that they were only “economic
59
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incrementalists and welfare seekers.”65 Neofunctionalists have also overestimated the role of
interest groups in affecting policy.
For the purpose of this study, neofunctionalism, despite the criticisms, provides relevant
framework in that EU integration has been deepened across sectors and as a result, new states
that want to join have to meet sectoral requirements. Integration is a process and enlargement can
be viewed as another stage in the integration process, that is in the expansion stage (widening
and deepening).
Another theory, liberal intergovermentalism (LI) is known as a “baseline theory,” to
which other integration theories are often compared.66 It rests on two basic assumptions. First,
states are actors and can achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiations and
bargaining, rather than through a centralized authority creating and enforcing decisions. The first
assumption differs from realism because national security is not the dominant motivation, state
power is not based on coercion, state preferences and identities are not identical, and interstate
institutions are not insignificant.67 Liberal intergovermentalists acknowledge that states in
institutions such as the EU are in control of their decision-making and political legitimacy. The
second assumption is that states are rational. Actors will always choose the course of action that
maximizes their utility under the circumstances. Agreements to cooperate or establish
international institutions are a collective outcome of interdependent rational state choices and
intergovernmental negotiations.68
The prominent author of LI is Andrew Moravcsik. In his book, The Choice of Europe, he
argued that EU integration is best understood as a series of rational choices made by national
65

Arne Niemann, and Philippe C. Schmitter. "Neofunctionalism.” p. 53
Andrew Moravcsik, and Frank Schimmelfennig. "Liberal Intergovermentalism." European Integration Theory. By
Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. Second ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 67-87 p. 67
67
Ibid. p. 68
68
Ibid. p. 68
66

24
leaders. These choices respond to constraints and opportunities coming from three areas: first,
from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents; second, from state power
stemming from asymmetrical interdependence; and finally from the role of institutions in
bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments.69
Liberal intergovermentalism is not without its share of critics. Rational-choice
institutionalists assert that liberal intergovermentalism cannot explain everyday decision-making
and is limited to only a small sliver of EU policy-making in which institutions plays a small role.
Historical institutionalists argue that liberal intergovernmentalists only focus on “conscious
intergovernmental decision-making at treaty-amending moments.” 70
Another relevant theory is multilevel governance. Governance implies the capacity of a
society to develop some means of making and implementing collective choices. An example
would be the development of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). This mechanism
involves the member countries creating their own goals and benchmarks for pursuing European
policies, rather than using the conventional top-down means of goal setting.71 It is part of a
movement toward new governance in which the tools used to enact public programs are softer
and based on more negotiation than on the use of authority.
The idea of multilevel governance was developed in order to understand the
implementation of European directives. The model recognizes the existence of national
governments in the EU as well as the importance of regional governments.72 Because it
empowers and creates regional entities, multi-level governance legitimizes the EU. However, the

69

Ibid. p. 69
Ibid. p. 73
71
"Open Method of Coordination." Investing in European Research. EUROPA. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/coordination/coordination01_en.htm>
72
B. Guy Peters, and Jon Pierre. "Governance Approaches." European Integration Theory. By Antje Wiener and
Thomas Diez. Second ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 91-104 p. 95
70

25
development of these relationships provides some social and political groups with greater
influence over the integration process.
In relation to this study, liberal intergovermentalism is useful in that members will
calculate the advantages of enlargement in terms of the costs and benefits of socioeconomic
interdependence. New members want to join the EU on the basis of both domestic and state
preferences. Meanwhile, existing members have shown variable enthusiasm about welcoming
new members, again based on their preferences. This has impacted the level of conditionality
imposed on perspective candidates.
Finally, multilevel governance is a strategy that explains how the Commission works.
The EU has little implementation capacity of its own, and thus depends upon the member states
in order to be able to put policy choices into effect. The assumption is that the directives coming
from the Commission will be implemented as intended.73
In the next chapter, we will be looking at the past European enlargements and how they
have affected the Europeanization of the Western Balkans.
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Chapter 3: Background on EU Enlargement
For more than half a decade, the EU has grown considerably. From six countries in 1951
(Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands in the European Coal and
Steel Community, the EU has grown to twenty seven today.1 It has a population close to 500
million and economically is a superpower that competes with the United States.2 There have
been five successive enlargements since 1951:
•

1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Community (EC)

•

1981: Greece joined the EC

•

1986: Spain and Portugal joined the EC

•

1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU

•

2004: In the largest EU enlargement, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU

•

2007: Completing the current enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU3

The procedures for accession into the EU are set out in the Treaty of the European Union in
articles 6 and 49. They state respectively:
Article 6 (1)

The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the
Member States.4
Article 49
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to
become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which
shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of
1
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the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component
members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is
founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the
Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification
by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements.5
Since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the procedures for accession have remained relatively
unchanged. The 1987 Single European Act added the requirement that the European
Parliament’s consent was needed when approving an association agreement during the accession
process.6 Also, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam clarified the political conditions by inserting the
reference to Article 6 which stated the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law which are common to all
member states.
Until the 1990s, there appeared no need for an enlargement policy beyond the rules of
Article 49 and case-by-case bargaining among the member states and between existing members
and candidate countries. The Iron Curtain prevented one half of Europe from contemplating EU
membership. The rest of Western Europe was either skeptical about deeper integration or under
authoritarian regimes. Thus, enlargement was restricted to fairly discrete episodes, and ad hoc
bargaining.7
Until the end of the Cold War, the challenge to the European Union became to create an
enlargement policy that went beyond the traditional procedures for accepting new members. In
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other words, the question was how best to manage relations with countries that wanted to join,
but were not yet ready to enforce the body of EU legislation.8
A key element in this new policy is how to provide support for the transition to market
economies and democracy and whether to use the prospect of EU membership to support such
reforms. The prospect of reforming the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs)
appealed to the EU’s greater foreign policy goal of bringing stability in the European
neighborhood.9
In 1989, the EU developed a policy framework that went far beyond the procedures in
Article 49 of the Treaty. Enlargement policy now comes into play long before a country
officially applies for membership and accession negotiations are only the final stage in a much
longer process. The enlargement process can be broken down into three stages: associate
process; being recognized as a potential candidate country and the development of a policy
framework for accession; and accession negotiations. During each phase, the EU uses
conditionality to link progress from one phase to the next until certain conditions are met.10 As of
March 2012, there are nine countries vying to become EU members. They are all in varying
degrees of the accession process.
Croatia is the only acceding country, due to become a member on July 1, 2013.11 Iceland,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey are all candidate
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countries.12 Finally, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo under UN Security Council
resolution 1244 are considered potential candidate countries.13
A country’s application for membership is no longer the first stage of accession. Until the
1995 enlargement, the process usually started with an application because countries were mostly
judged to be already in a position to apply and enforce the acquis (EU laws). There were some
exceptions in the cases of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. All three shook off right-wing
dictatorships in the mid-1970s and wanted to join the EU as soon as possible to end their relative
isolation, stabilize their newly established democracies, and develop their economies. Although
Greece was able to join within a relatively short time, the accession negotiations with Spain and
Portugal were long and drawn out.14 Despite the Commission advising against early accession
for Greece for economic reasons, the Council saw the Greek case from a political perspective
and disregarded the Commission’s advice.15 Greece became the tenth member of the EC in
January 1981. The Council saw membership of the European Community as a way to strengthen
Greece’s democracy and it wanted to ensure stability on its southern border.
Not wanting to be lumped in with Spain, given that some EC countries feared that
Spain’s accession would bring negative consequences, Portugal applied to join the EC in March
1977, more than a year before Spain applied. The Commission identified numerous economic,
structural, and administrative issues (mainly textiles, migrant workers, fisheries, and agriculture)
that had to be addressed before they could recommend a timetable for accession.16 Even though
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Portugal made progress, such as reaching an agreement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to restructure the economy, the main point of contention was with regard to agriculture
and fisheries. Therefore, Spain’s and Portugal’s negotiations became increasingly linked.
The main opposition to Spain came from France, concerned over the impact of Spanish
agriculture on the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Spain’s accession would have increased
the EC’s agricultural area by thirty percent and farm workforce by twenty-five percent.17 Spain,
for its part, was unwilling to accept all the obligations of membership, specifically the need to
launch a value-added tax, curtail subsidies, and curb protectionism. The situation improved when
the new government of Felipe González, embarked on a goodwill tour to promote Spanish
accession. Despite this, in a dispute over the Common Fisheries Policy, Spanish fishermen
attacked foreign trucks and in turn, French truckers blockaded the Spanish border throughout
1984.18
The breakthrough for both Iberian countries came at the Fontainebleau summit in June
1984, when national leaders announced that enlargement would take place in June 1984. In
March 1985, foreign ministers resolved the remaining issues: fisheries, free movement of
Spanish and Portuguese workers in the EC, and the applicant countries’ budgetary
contributions.19 The final major agreement was the Integrated Mediterranean Programs, proposed
by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in 1985. The program called for financial
assistance mainly to Greece but also to Italy and southern France to help develop agriculture,
tourism, and small business. Papandreou linked this program with enlargement.20 In March 1985,
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the European Council agreed to the program in order “to adjust under the best conditions
possible to the new situation created by enlargement.”21 On January 1, 1987, Portugal and Spain
joined the EC.
The first step of the accession process is establishing closer relations with potential
member states through association agreements. They are a long standing tool for the EU’s
external relations and in recent history, necessary for membership. Three examples of association
agreements are the European Economic Area (EEA), Europe Agreements (EA), and the
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).
On January 1, 1994, the EU and the member states of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) created the European Economic Area as a long term framework for relations
between them. EFTA was created in 1959 as an alternative to the EC for those that mistrusted
supranationality or sought to keep their distance from the West for fear of antagonizing the
USSR.22 The EFTA originally consisted of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In 1961, Finland became an associate member, then a full
member in 1986. Iceland joined EFTA in 1970. After joining the EEC, the UK and Denmark left
the EFTA. Portugal followed suit in 1985 to become an EC member and Lichtenstein joined the
EFTA in 1991.23
Having already adopted much of the EU’s acquis in the mid 1980s, the EFTA countries
called for a role in creating single market policies that directly affected them. When the
Commission refused, a number of EFTA countries considered joining the EC. However, the EC
21
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had just completed the Iberian enlargement (Spain and Portugal) and was uninterested in
acquiring new members.24 As a compromise, the Commission proposed the EEA, a huge
integrated market intended to encompass the twelve EC and seven EFTA members (Austria,
Finland, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). The EEA would be the
largest and most lucrative commercial bloc, accounting for forty percent of global trade.25
However, the EFTA countries considered the EEA to be only a transitional regime on the
way to full membership. The EEA was further undermined by the European Court of Justice’s
(ECJ) Opinion (1/1991) that the participation of EFTA judges was incompatible with EU law.26
The opinion prevented a more symmetrical relationship between the EU and EFTA and thus
reduced the appeal of the EAA as an alternative to enlargement.27 Following the accession of
Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the EU in 1995 and the rejection by Swiss voters in December
1992, the EAA no longer was viewed as a path towards enlargement.28
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU looked to devise an agreement for relations
with the Central and European Countries (CEESCs). In December 1989, the Council agreed to
create the appropriate form of association and the Commission’s Directorate-General for
External Relations sketched a broad framework.29 In April 1990, The Council agreed to create
Europe Agreements (EA) as a new type of association agreement. EAs were offered to the
leading reformers, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.30 The EAs called for the creation of
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free trade zones, the gradual adoption of EU legislation, and the launch of political dialogue.
Most importantly, the agreement acknowledged that accession was the ultimate objective.31
The EU policy towards Central and Eastern Europe was based on two principles: a single
policy framework open to all countries in the region that sought to deepen their relations with the
EU and the preservation of an element of differentiation which allowed the EU to place
conditions on membership. The single policy framework spoke for the need for a visible and
coherent EU policy towards post-communist Europe that would utilize the EU’s financial and
administrative resources effectively and protect the EU from criticism that its commitment to the
region was inconsistent.32 The second principle, differentiation, was created out of the belief that
the EU should not deal with the region en bloc. Rather the EU should use conditionality based on
the merits of individual performance.
Although accession negotiations were opened up around the same time as the CEESCs,
both Romania and Bulgaria underwent a much different accession process (accession
negotiations opened up with Romania and Bulgaria on February 15, 2000).33 Both Romania and
Bulgaria were given much tighter EU conditionalities during the negotiations of their
Association Agreements in 1992. Their Europe Agreements included a “human rights clause”
that made explicit reference to the protection of minority rights and a “unilateral suspension”
that allowed either party to suspend cooperation in case the obligations of the agreement were
not met.34 In addition, the Commission put forward a series of post-accession conditionalities
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that allowed the Commission to monitor Romania and Bulgaria’s compliance with the acquis
even after the two countries formally acceded to the EU. The “cooperation and verification
benchmarks” set a series of benchmarks (six for Bulgaria and four for Romania) to be regularly
monitored by the Commission with the threat that if they were not carried out, it would lead to
the withdrawal of EU funding and the suspension of bilateral cooperation with other EU member
states on judicial matters.35 These threats have been carried out, most recently in Bulgaria in
2008, where €220 million was withdrawn as a result of a failure to tackle corruption.36
Despite a seeming lack of progress, both countries were put on the fast track to accession
due to a new EU security thinking for the wider Balkan region and as a reward for their crucial
support to NATO during the Kosovo war.37 Bulgaria and Romania became EU members on
January 1, 2007.
Using the Europe Agreements as a template, the EU set out to create a regional
framework for the Western Balkan countries. I will go into more detail about this approach later
on in the chapter but in short, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was launched at a
European summit in Zagreb, Croatia, in 2000. SAP aimed to support the economic and
democratic transition of the Western Balkans and foster regional cooperation. It saw all SAP
members as potential EU candidates.38 The two key elements of the SAP are a specific type of
association agreement, stabilization and association agreements (SAAs), and financial assistance
through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization
(CARDS), now replaced, as discussed below by the Instruments for pre-Accession (IPA).
35
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Association agreements provide the legal framework for would-be-members, until accession,
even after they achieve the next two steps: potential candidate status and pre-accession
alignment.39
Once a country submits its application, the Commission conducts a “screening process”
with the applicant country. It assesses whether the applicant is able to apply the acquis, and
identifies possible challenges for the negotiations.40 After the screening process, the Commission
drafts a common EU position that requires unanimous agreement by the Council. Then the
Council decides unanimously to open, and afterward close provisionally, negotiations on specific
chapters of the acquis. The acquis includes a number of elements, including:
•

Content, principles and political objectives of all EU Treaties;

•

Legislation and decisions adopted pursuant to the EU Treaties, and the case law of
the ECJ;

•

Interinstitutional agreements, resolutions, statements, recommendations, and
guidelines, legally binding or not, which were adopted by the EU;

•

Joint actions, common positions, declarations, conclusions and other acts within
the framework of the common foreign and security policy;

•

Joint actions, positions, conventions signed, resolutions, statements and other acts
agreed within the framework of justice and home affairs and;
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•

International agreements concluded by the Communities, the Communities jointly
with their Member States, the EU, and those concluded by the Member States
among themselves with regard to EU activities.41

In the 2004 enlargement, there were thirty-one chapters, while in the case of Croatia, there are
thirty-five chapters. The acquis itself is not negotiable and this precedent was established during
the first enlargement round.42 The EU expects candidates to adjust unilaterally to existing EU
laws, even if established policies and practices do not fit their specific situation. A timetable for
adopting the acquis is the only thing candidate countries can negotiate.43 Among the candidate
countries, Iceland and Turkey are the only ones with closed chapters.
During the pre-accession process, the European Commission gives its opinion on whether
the candidate is meeting the conditions of membership through progress reports and official
opinions.44 The opinions are not binding and the Commission sends them to the European
Council, which decides unanimously whether to accept them or not. Only in the case of Greece
has the Council not followed the Commission’s recommendations.45 The two most recent
opinions involved Croatia’s accession to the EU and Serbia’s application for membership.
After the negotiations have concluded, and the European Parliament gives its consent, an
accession treaty is signed by all governments and the candidate becomes an accession country.
The Draft Accession Treaty lists all the transitional arrangements and deadlines, as well as the
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details of financial arrangements and any safeguard clauses.46 Then the treaty has to be ratified
by all member states and the acceding country.47
Once the Accession Treaty is signed, the candidate becomes an acceding state, and is
entitled to privileges until accession makes it a member state. It can comment on draft EU
proposals, communications, recommendations, and initiatives, and has “active observer status”
on EU bodies and agencies, where it can speak but not vote.48 Subsequently, once the ratification
process is finished, and the treaty enters into force on the scheduled date, then the accession state
becomes a member state. Ratification has not always been successful. Ratification referendums
failed twice in Norway in 1972 and 1994. Also, France is the only member state to hold a
referendum to ratify an accession treaty, in the case of the accession of the UK.49
In addition to what is required in Article 49 in the Treaty of the European Union, the EU
has put other conditions on the pre- accession process. The first direct statement of accession
conditions came from the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993. At the meeting, the
Council declared for the first time that the CEECs that wanted membership could eventually
become members. Many member states were reluctant about this and a debate ensued concerning
the membership criteria. Some argued for quantitative criteria, such as a specific level of GDP
per capita, in order to reduce the possibility of politically motivated decisions for or against
enlargement.50 The Council accepted the Commission’s proposal for qualitative conditions that
included not only the ability to apply the acquis after accession, but also political and economic
criteria. The Copenhagen criteria require a candidate to have:
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•

Stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities;

•

A functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of
competition and the market forces at work inside the Union;

•

The ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to
the objectives of political, economic and monetary union.51

In 1995, the European Council in Madrid added administrative capacity to the criteria. The
Council stated, “…the strategy will have to be intensified in order to create the conditions for
the gradual, harmonious integration of those States, particularly through the development of
the market economy, the adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a
stable economic and monetary environment.”52
In order to prepare countries for membership, the EU provides financial assistance to both
candidate and potential candidate countries. The countries that receive financial assistance are:
Croatia, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, FYROM, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Kosovo. The total pre-accession funding for 2007-2013 is €11.5 billion.53 Since January 1, 2007,
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) has been the financial instrument for all preaccession funding. It replaces the Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their
Economies (PHARE) program, Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-Accession (ISPA),
51
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Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD), the Turkey
pre-accession instrument, and the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and
Stabilization (CARDS), bringing them all into a single framework.54
The IPA consists of five components:
I.

Transition Assistance and Institution Building: Focuses on building and strengthening
of the institutional framework related to the adoption and implementation of the
acquis. Component I is open to all candidate and potential candidates and is managed
by the Directorate-General (DG) Enlargement.

II.

Cross Border Cooperation: Supports cross-border cooperation between candidates
and potential candidates and with the EU Member States. It can also fund
participation in transnational cooperation programs and Sea Basin programs.
Component II is open to all candidate and potential candidates and is managed by the
DG Enlargement and DG Regional Policy

III.

Regional Development: Finances in areas of environmental protection, and transport,
as well as the promotion of competiveness and regional development. It is open to
candidate countries only and is managed by Directorate-General Regional Policy

IV.

Human Resources Development: Focuses on employment, education, and training, as
well as social inclusion. It is open to candidate countries only and is managed by
Directorate-General Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.

V.

Rural Development: Contributes to sustainable rural development. It provides
assistance for the restructuring of agriculture and its adaption to EU standards in the
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areas of environmental protection, public health, animal and plant health, animal
welfare, and occupational safety. It is open to candidate countries only and is
managed by Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development.55
The granting of IPA funding is based on the beneficiary country’s respect for the
principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human, minority rights, and fundamental freedoms.
It can be in the form of investments, procurements, contracts, subsidies, administrative
cooperation, actions by the EU in the interest of the beneficiary country, measures to support the
implementation process and program management, and budget support. 56
Within the IPA is the Multi-Annual Indicative Financial Framework (MIFF), which is
designed to provide information on the indicative breakdown of financial allocations by IPA
beneficiaries. It acts as a link between the political framework within the enlargement package
and budgetary process.57 The MIFF takes the form of a financial table covering a three year
period, which is elaborated on the basis of the beneficiaries’ needs, absorption capacity,
management capacity, and conditionality. Taking into account the framework proposed in the
MIFF, the Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Documents (MIPD) are established for each
country and list the assistance priorities.
In addition, the multi-beneficiary programmes under Component I are designed to
complement the national programs and to strengthen relations in the Western Balkans. Both
regional and horizontal projects benefit from IPA assistance. Multi-beneficiary programmes
support the Regional School for Public Administration, the Central European Free trade
55
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Agreements (CEFTA), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), fight against organized crime,
and European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS)
scholarships and higher education.58 Institution building is also supported by the Technical
Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX). Assistance from TAIEX comes in
three forms, assessment missions, expert missions, and study visits. TAIEX coordinates expert
workshops which provide specifics of EU legislation, regulation, procedures, and best practices.
Assessment missions are a peer-based exercise whose purpose is to identify needs, provide a gap
analysis or elaborate a strategy in a given sector.59 Expert missions involve experts from one or
two Member States traveling to beneficiary countries and providing them with in-depth advice
on specific parts of EU legislation, regulation, and best practices.60 Finally, study visits consist of
three practitioners from the beneficiary country going on a study visit to EU member states
lasting up to five days.61 TAIEX provides assistance to the Western Balkan Countries, Turkey,
Iceland, Northern Cyrus, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine and
Russia.62
In the latest MIFF 2012-2013, there were seven sectors for 2011-2013 that the
Commission focused its assistance on. They are justice and home affairs and fundamental rights;
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public administration reform; environment and climate change; transports; private sector
development; social development; and agriculture and rural developments.63
The IPA is monitored by the Commission through its services in DG enlargement, DG
Regional policy, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, DG Agriculture and
Rural Development, and through the EU’s missions in the beneficiary countries.64 Once a year,
the Commission puts out its report in the form of “the Annual Report on Financial Assistance for
Enlargement.”65
The first EU initiative aimed at stabilizing the Western Balkans was the Royaumont
Process in December 1996. It came right after the Dayton Peace Accords and focused on
promoting regional projects in civil society, culture and human rights.66 In April 1997, the EU
General Affairs Council adopted the Regional Approach, establishing political and economic
conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with the five Western Balkan countries
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and
FYROM). The conditions included the respect for democratic principles, human rights, and the
rules of law; protection of minorities; market economy reforms; and regional cooperation.67
However, the Regional Approach had limited success and focused more on the suspension of,
and/or or exclusion form agreements, or the freezing of financial assistance.68
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The Kosovo war showed the EU that their instruments of foreign policy, crisis
management, and the Regional Approach were not working. The EU realized that a new
approach was needed. The German Foreign Minister at the time, Joschka Fischer, summarized it
best when he said, “if the awful conflict in Kosovo has brought something good with it, it is that
we understand our belonging together far better.”69 Thus, the EU moved toward a two-pronged
approach involving regional cooperation and closer ties with Europe.
The EU launched the Stability Pact (SP) for the Western Balkans, simultaneously with
the approval of Security Council resolution 1244. The SP received a broad mandate from the EU,
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Group of 8 (G8), NATO, and a
large number of other states and institutions as a comprehensive form of preventive diplomacy.70
The pact aimed to promote “peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic
prosperity” in the region.71 The cornerstone of the SP was regional cooperation that called on the
Balkan countries to first cooperate among themselves and then with international actors towards
reaching a set of common objectives (creating a secure environment, promoting sustainable
democratic systems, and promoting economic and social well-being). The SP was perceived as
an intergovernmental body providing a forum for dialogue and cooperation. From a political
perspective, the SP showed the international community’s commitment to the Western Balkans,
while practically, it allowed for much needed coordination of various international structures.72
The SP was soon overtaken by the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).
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In the SAP, the Commission insisted on six new instruments: development of existing
economic and trade relations with and within the region; development and partial redirection of
existing economic and financial assistance; increased assistance for democratization, civil
society, education, and institution-building; co-operation in the area of justice and home affairs;
development of political dialogue, including at the regional level; and the development of
Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA).73
The SAA, the centerpiece of SAP, represents a contractual relationship between the EU
and each Western Balkan country. The SAA focuses on respect for key democratic principles
and the core elements which are at the heart of the EU single market. Just as the Europe
Agreements did for the CEECs, the SAA provides the tools so the EU can bring the Western
Balkans closer to the EU standards.74 Effective implementation of the SAA is a prerequisite for
any further talks of accession. The EU signed the first SAA agreement with FYROM in April
2001, followed by Croatia in October 2001.75 Albania signed their SAA on June 12 2006 and
then Montenegro followed suit on October 15, 2007. On April 29, 2008, Serbia signed their SAA
follow by Bosnia and Herzegovina on June 16, 2008. Kosovo is the only Western Balkan state
that has not signed a SAA.
The main financial instrument for SAP was the CARDS program. It had four main
objectives:
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•

Reconstruction, democratic stabilization, reconciliation, and the return of
refugees;

•

Institutional and legislative development, including harmonization with EU norms
and approaches, in order to underpin democracy and the rule of law.

•

Sustainable economic and social developments, including structural reform and;

•

Promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation among SAP countries76

The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) managed CARDS for FYROM, Serbia,
Montenegro, and Kosovo, while the EU was responsible for managing CARDS in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before it was replaced by the IPA, the EU allocated €4.65 billion in the
period of 2002 to 2006.77
At the Zagreb Summit in November 2000, the EU Council reaffirmed the “European
perspective of the countries participating in the stabilization and association process and their
status as potential candidates for membership.”78 Three years after the Zagreb Summit, on June
16, 2003, the Thessaloniki Summit confirmed the SAP as the policy framework for the EU
provides the overall framework for helping the Western Balkan Countries to meet the
Copenhagen Criteria and to eventually join the EU.79
In the next chapter, I will examine my three case studies, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, focusing on the assistance they receive transitioning to democracy, including such
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good governance areas as the fight against corruption and minority rights and refugees. The
discussion is undertaken in the context of my hypothesis which is clearer and stronger
conditionality is needed in the EU’s enlargement policy for the Western Balkans.

47
Chapter 4: Transition to Democracy-Problems, EU Conditions and Support
In this chapter, I will examine the countries of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, focusing on the assistance they receive transitioning to democracy, including such
good governance areas as the fight against corruption and the protection of minority rights and
refugees. I will first explain the nature of each problem. Then I will cover the EU’s demands.
Finally, I will describe the projects, i.e. where the money is going to assist the three countries.
As noted in the last chapter, the EU places certain conditions on candidate and potential
candidate countries and then provides assistance under the Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance (IPA). The focus in this study is on the IPA funding for the Component I-Transition
and Institution Building, which covers all institution-building actions and investments related to
the acquis.1 The IPA helps recipient countries build up administrative and judicial capacity and
address cooperation measures not expressly covered by other components.2
Croatia
Croatia has come a long way from when it declared independence from Yugoslavia on
June 25, 1991. In the war for Croatia’s independence, Croatian nationalist forces battled the
Serbian minority paramilitaries which were backed by the powerful federal army, the Yugoslav
People’s Army (JNA). Fighting was ferocious on both sides, giving rise to the term “ethnic
cleansing.”3 In 1991 alone, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR)
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estimated that 20,000 people were killed, 200,000 refugees fled from Croatia, and 350,000
became internally displaced.4
During the war in Croatia, the European Community (EC) was criticized for how they
handled the situation. The EC was accused of being ambiguous and vague in their mediation
goals. At times, they supported Yugoslav unity while other times the EU called for Croatia’s
self-determination. On January 15, 1992, despite the recommendations of its own commission,
the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, the EC formally recognized
Croatia. 5 Croatia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement on October 29, 2001 and
applied for EU membership on February 21, 2003. The Commission lays down benchmarks for
Croatia in thirty-five policy areas, all of which were satisfied by June 30, 2011. Table 4.1 shows
the overall assistance given to Croatia from 2003 to 2013.
Table 4.1 Croatia CARDS and IPA Assistance: 2003-2013 (million €)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
81
105 140 141.2 146 151.2 153.5 156.5 151.1 95.4
Overall Assistance 62
(Compiled from CARDS and IPA Financial Assistance to Croatia:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/cards/statistics20002006_en.htm> and <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/acceeding-country/croatia/financialassistance/index_en.htm>
a.
b.

For 2003-2006: Financial allocation was administered under CARDS.
For 2007-2013: Financial allocation was administered under the IPA

Transition to Democracy
In 2003, Croatia held elections for the second time in its post-Communist history, which
resulted in the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) returning to power. HDZ promoted a proEuropean Union platform and presented itself as a modern European conservative party.
International and domestic observers deemed the 2003 elections as free and fair. However, the
4
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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) expressed serious concern about
the country’s legislative framework for election, the absence of a permanent election
administration, and the limited access to polling stations for refugee voters outside Croatia.6 In
addition, Freedom House in their Nations in Transit 2004 Report noted that one of the most
serious issues was the judiciary because of the slow pace of judicial reform and a backlog of 1.3
million cases inherited from the 1990s.7
In 2005, the EU reported that two elections were held in Croatia. One was presidential
elections held over two rounds on January 2 and 16, 2005. The other was local elections held on
May 15, 2005 for 426 municipal and 123 city councils, twenty county assemblies, and a new
Zagreb City Assembly.8 According to the State Elections Committee and local NGO GONG,
which observed both elections, voting in both the presidential and local elections were held in a
tolerant atmosphere without any major irregularities. The irregularities observed mainly
concerned out-of country voting and cases of double voting.9 The Commission also noted that
there was a serious lack of clarity on the implementation of the provisions of the Constitutional
Law on Minorities (CLNM) that dealt with allocation of reserved seats for minority
representatives.10
In 2007, the EU’s Progress Report noted that the Croatian parliament adopted a number
of laws that addressed outstanding issues related to electoral legislation. However, they
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expressed their concern that the data on permanent residence, which is the basis for voter
registration, is incorrect.11
To help assist Croatia in stabilizing their democracy, the EU provided €50.5 million from
2002 to 2004 in CARDS assistance.12 Assistance focused on improving the legislative process,
helping institutions in administering new election laws, and providing support to the media and
civil society. The IPA does not provide projects that deal specifically with democratic
stabilization. In addition, technical assistance to improve the legislative and administrative
framework is provided by the OSCE.
Governance Issues
Corruption
When Croatia applied for membership in 2003, it was ranked 59 out of 133 countries (the
least corrupted country being placed first, and the most corrupted 133) by Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).13 Such ranking meant that corruption was
estimated to be very high. In December 2001, the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and
Organized Crime (USKOK) was established to help prosecute corruption and organized crime.
USKOK is attached to the State Attorney’s office.14 In 2002, the National Anti-Corruption
Programme and Action Plan was drawn up. However, abuse of office was not covered in
USKOK’s mandate until July 2007. Thus, it was difficult for the Croatian prosecution authority
to employ USKOK in high level corruption cases. Also, some law enforcement agencies and
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state bodies involved in the fight against corruption were not providing reports to USKOK,
which they are required to do by law.15
With respect to the 2002 National Programme, it prioritized declarations of political will
and the recognition that corruption constituted a serious problem for society. On March 31, 2006,
the 2002 National Programme was replaced by the 2006-2008 National Programme for the
Suppression of Corruption, which stressed the Croatian government’s determination to curb
corruption by strengthening institutional capacity.16 Before 2006, the stress had been on the
enactment of legislation; after 2006 it was on strengthening law enforcement.17
The 2007 Progress Report commented that while some activities of the 2006-2008
National Programme were being caried out, such as awareness raising, training, and increased
transparency through the use of the internet, action plans of the different authorities responsible
for implementing the Programme were not sufficiently detailed.18 A National Council for the
Fight against Corruption, which was established to monitor the implementation of the National
Programme was said to interpret its mandate too restrictively and to not see its role as making
any proposals to improve the implementation of the National Programme but merely to monitor
it.19
To help improve the anti-corruption framework, the EU provided €17.033.500 since
2003.20 Table 4.2 shows the assistance provided under CARDS from 2003 to 2006. Table 4.3
shows the projects and funding under the IPA.

15

Commission Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report. p. 51
Anti-corruption Strategies and Action Plans in South-eastern Europe-current Status. Rep. no. PC-TC-(2006)16.
PACO Impact, July 2006. Web. 3 May 2012.
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/projects/paco%20impact/PC-TC(2006)16-ACStrategies4July.PDF> p. 90
17
Ibid. p. 90
18
Commission Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report. p. 51
19
Ibid. p. 51
20
Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011
16
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Table 4.2: CARDS Assistance to Fight Corruption-Croatia (million €)
2003
7.0
Overall Assistance
(Source: European Commission Financial Assistance:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm>)

2004
0

2005
2.0

2006
2.5

Table 4.3: IPA Projects to Fight Corruption-Croatia
Projects

Overall
Objective
and
Purpose

21

Strengthening the
Capacities of the Office
for the Suppression of
Corruption and
Organized Crime
(USKOK) 21
Objective
-Strengthen the rule of law
by increasing the
investigation and
prosecution capacity of the
fight against corruption and
organized crime

Improving Anti-Corruption
Inter-Agency Cooperation22

Restoration and
Equipping of the
Premises for PNUSKOK
Osijek and Rijeka23

Objective
-Strengthen the rule of law
through the implementation
of the National Anti
Corruption Strategies and
inter-agency cooperation at
national and local levels

Objective
-Enhance the capacity of
the Ministry of Interior to
combat organized crime
and corruption

Purpose
-Improve the institutional
capacity and efficient
functioning of USKOK and
continue the implementation
of the National Program for
combating corruption 20062008

Purpose
1. Strengthen the Ministry
of Justice Independent
Department for Strategic
Development (IDSD) as a
coordination body in
charge of drafting and
implementing anticorruption strategies
2. Strengthen the
professional ethics in
state and local
administration and within
judiciary bodies
3. Improve inter-agency
cooperation by
developing a information
system with

Purpose
-Create preconditions for
the effective operation of
the National Police Office
for Suppression of
Corruption and Organized
Crime (PNUSKOK)
departments Osijek and
Rijeka

Strengthening Capacities of USKOK. Rep. no. HR2007/01/23/1. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/hr2007_01_23_1_version_07.09.2007_en.pdf> p. 2-13
22
Improving Anti-Corruption Inter-Agency Co-operation. Rep. no. HR2007/01/23/2. European Commission. Web.
15 Mar. 2012. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/hr2007_01_23_2_version_07092007_en.pdf> p. 2
23
Restoration and Equipping of the Premises for PNUSKOK Osijek and Rijeka. Rep. no. IPA/2011/022-954/3.
European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/2011/03_pn_uskok_osijek_and_rijeka.pdf> p. 2
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Table 4.3 Continued:
Projects

Overall Objective
and Purpose

Budget

Implementation
Schedule

Strengthening the
Improving AntiCapacities of the Office for Corruption Inter-Agency
the Suppression of
Cooperation
Corruption and Organized
Crime (USKOK)
4. a central database and
secure Intranet/Internet
access
Raise awareness on
corruption through
developing and
implementing a public
awareness campaign
€1.270.00 (€1.252.000 in
€2.550.000 (€2.488.000 in
EU contributions and
EU contributions and
€17.500 in national
€62.000 in national
contributions)
contributions)
Contract Signed: 4Q
Contract Signed: 4Q
2008/Project Completed: 4Q 2008/Project Completed:
2010
3Q 2010

Restoration and
Equipping of the
Premises for
PNUSKOK Osijek
and Rijeka

€2.110.000
(€1.793.500 in EU
contributions and
€316.000 in national
contributions)
Contract signed: 1Q
2013/Project
Completed: 4Q 2013

(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Croatia <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/acceedingcountry/croatia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>)
Minority Rights and Refugees
In the area of minority rights and refugees several problems needed addressing. The Serb
minority faced major discrimination in the public sector in access to employment. Second, Roma
were excluded from mainstream life and face difficult living conditions. There was
discrimination against Roma in access to employment, housing, and schooling.24 The Roma have
no legal status or citizenship and coordination among Roma groups is weak and lacking
expertise.
In relation to refugees, former tenancy rights holders as well as others were encountering
major housing problems when they attempted to return. The Croatian government implemented

24

Croatia 2005 and 2007 Progress Report
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housing care programs within and outside the areas of special state concern (ASSC) for the
former tenancy rights holders who wished to return to Croatia but the process of providing
housing was extremely slow.25 Apart from housing issues, refugees faced problems in accessing
employment, enduring hostilities in validating certain documents and rights, including pension
rights, of those living in the parts of Croatia not under the Croatian government’s control during
the 1990s. 26 To address these problems, the EU provided €33.386.225 in funding.27 Table 4.4
shows the overall amount under CARDS while Table 4.4 shows the projects and funding under
the IPA.
Table 4.4: CARDS Assistance to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Croatia (million €)
2003
2004
2005
2006
15
13
0
0
Overall Assistance
(Source: European Commission Financial Assistance:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm>
Table 4.5: IPA Projects to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees in Croatia
Projects

Roma support
Project-Phase III28

Overall
Objective
and Purpose

Objective
-Enhance and
facilitate active and
full participation of
the Roma

25

Establishing a
comprehensive system for
anti-discrimination
protection29
Objective
Support the establishment
of an efficient and effective
system for combating

Upgrading the capacitates for
minors and other vulnerable
groups of illegal migrants in the
Reception Centre for Aliens30
Objective
Strengthen institutional capacities
of the ministry of Interior in order
to

Commission Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report p. 13
Ibid. p. 14
27
Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011
28
Roma Support Project – Phase III. Rep. no. HR2008-01-35-05. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/2008/2008-0101-05_roma_support_project__phase_iii_version_081010_en.pdf> p. 2-12
29
Establishing a Comprehensive System for Anti-discrimination Protection. Rep. no. HR2009-01-36-02. European
Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/2009/04_establishing_a_comprehensive_system_for_antidiscrimination_protection.pdf> p. 2-14
30
Upgrading the Capacities for Minors and Other Vulnerable Groups of Illegal Migrants in the Reception Centre
for Aliens. Rep. no. IPA/2011/ 022-954/6. European Commission, 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/2011/06_reception_centre_for_foreigners.pdf> p. 2-13
26
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Table 4.5 Continued
Projects
Roma support ProjectPhase III

Overall
Objective and
Purpose

Budget

Implementation
Schedule

national minority in the
economic, cultural, and
social life of Croatian
society
Goal
-Improve the
environmental and
general living
conditions of the
Roma settlements in
Orehovica and Mursko
Središće (Sitnice) in
Međimurje
County, by providing
access to communal
infrastructure and
utilities, such as roads,
water, and electricity
supply
€3.333.330 (€2.500.00
in EU contributions and
€833.330 in national
contributions)
Contract Signed: 4Q
2009/Project
Completed: 3Q 2010

Establishing a
comprehensive system for
anti-discrimination
protection

discrimination in order
for Croatia to meet EU
standards
Goal
1. Strengthen the
capacity of the Office of
the Ombudsman and the
Office for Human
Rights in combating
discrimination.
2. Develop an efficient
system for statistical
monitoring of the
reported and prosecuted
cases of discrimination
Elaborate a comprehensive
system of assistance to the
victims of discriminatory
practices
€800.000 (€738.000 in EU
contributions and €62.000 in
national contributions)
Contract Signed: 4Q
2010/Project Completed: 1Q
2013

Upgrading the
capacitates for minors
and other vulnerable
groups of illegal
migrants in the
Reception Centre for
Aliens
fulfill the requirements
of EU acquis in the field
of illegal migration
Goal
Fulfill the criteria of the
acquis concerning the
detention of minors,
illegal migrants, and other
vulnerable groups of
illegal migrants

€2.527.323 (€2.148.225
in EU contributions and
€379.098 in national
contributions)
Contract Signed: 4Q
2012/Project Completed:
4Q 2013

(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Croatia <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/acceedingcountry/croatia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>)

Serbia
Relations between the EU and Serbia have veered between positive and frictional. The
move to include Serbia in the EU can first be traced to the late 1980s and the fall of communism
in Europe. Yugoslavia was included in the Council Regulations on economic aid to certain
Central and Eastern European countries, but was removed when war broke out in the 1990s. In
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the late 1990s, a pledge for eventual membership was made to Serbia.31 In 1999, the Commission
officially extended the opportunity for Serbia to join once it had fulfilled the Copenhagen
Criteria. In 2000, the Zagreb Summit renewed the promise of including Serbia in the SAP and
signaled the prospect of signing the SAA.32 The Feasibility Report, released on April 12, 2005,
assessed Serbia as having progressed enough in meeting the SAP political and economic criteria
and as ready to negotiate an SAA.33 SAA negotiations with Serbia opened up on October 10,
2005. However the Commission found that the country did not meet its commitments with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and halted negotiations on
May 3, 2006. Specifically, it noted the lack of progress in apprehending Ratko Mladić and that
the “Action Plan” on co-operation with the ICTY suffered from deficiencies between civilian
and military security services and in the role and power of prosecution.34 Negotiations resumed
on June 13, 2007, after Serbia held parliamentary elections in January 2007, and a coalition made
up of pro-democracy and pro-EU parties won and pledged to fully cooperate with the ICTY.35
An SAA was finally signed on April 29, 2008 in Luxembourg along with the Interim
Agreement on trade and trade-related matters. EU ministers agreed to submit the SAA to their
parliaments for ratification as soon as the Council should decide that Serbia was fully
cooperating with the ICTY. Serbia submitted its application for EU membership on December
22, 2010 and subsequently on October 25, 2010, the Council asked the Commission to submit its
31

Johannes-Mikael Mäki. "EU Enlargement Politics: Explaining the Development of Political Conditionality of 'full
Cooperation with the ICTY' towards Western Balkans." Politička Misao 45.5 (2008): 47-80. p. 64
32
Ibid. p. 65
33
Communication from the Commission on the Preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to Negotiate a Stabilisation
and Association Agreement with the European Union. Rep. no. COM(2005) 476 Final. EUR-Lex, 14 Apr. 2005.
Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=505DC0476>
34
Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2006 Progress Report. Rep. no. COM (2006) 649 Final. Commission
of the European Communities, 8 Nov. 2006. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/sr_sec_1389_en.pdf> p. 15
35
"Serbian MPs Approve New Coalition." BBC News. BBC, 15 May 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6660113.stm>
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opinion on the application.36 On June 14, 2010, the Council decided to submit the SAA to their
parliaments for ratification after it was decided that Serbia was fully cooperating with the
ICTY.37
In their opinion on Serbia’s membership, the Commission found that Serbia had built up
a positive track record in implementing its obligations under SAP and the Copenhagen Criteria.
Also they noted that Serbia could take on the obligations of membership in nearly all of the
acquis, provided that the alignment process continues and efforts are made to ensure the
implementation and enforcement of legislation.38 Serbia became a European candidate country
on March 1, 2012. Table 4.6 shows the overall assistance given to Serbia from 2003 to 2013.
Table 4.6 Serbia CARDS and IPA Assistance: 2003-2013 (million €)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
324.3 307.9 282.5 257.5 189.7 190.9 194.8 197.9 201.8 202.0 214.7
Overall
Assistance
(Compiled from CARDS and IPA Financial Assistance to Serbia:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/serbia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>)
a.
b.

For 2003-2006: Financial allocation was administered under CARDS. Figures include the Republic of Serbia,
the Republic of Montenegro, and Kosovo under UNSCR 1244
For 2007-2013: Financial allocation was administered under the IPA

Transition to Democracy
Serbia’s democratic transition began much later than most post-Communist countries,
with the fall of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in October 2000. Democratization slowly resulted
from elections won by the opposition and massive protests that forced the regime to accept the

36

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Commission Opinion on
Serbia's Application for Membership of the European Union. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1208 Final. European
Commission, 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_rapport_2011_en.pdf> p. 2
37
Council Conclusions on the Western Balkans 3023rd Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Luxembourg, 14 June
2010. Rep. Council of the European Union, 14 June 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/key_document/council_conclusions_on_wb_june__2010_en.pdf> p. 2
38
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commission's Opinions on the Membership Applications by Serbia.
Rep. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_conclusions_2011_en.pdf> p. 1
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results. The transition to democracy was also negotiated, in that some members of the old regime
supported the opposition for the price of political protection.39 According to Freedom House, in
2005 Serbia’s constitutional environment was problematic because the charter of the State Union
of Serbia and Montenegro was frequently broken by both member states, and the 1990 Serbian
Constitution stayed in place. The Serbian parliament faced serious challenges due to political
instability and a lack of respect for legal procedures. The government of Serbia faced a serious
problem in the high degree of politicization of public administration.40 In April 2005, the EU
released a feasibility study on the preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate an SAA
with the EU. The study found that the judiciary was the main weakness in Serbia’s
transformation to democracy. Despite some legal reforms, the appointment of judges and
prosecutors remained susceptible to political pressure, and corruption was ever present.41
After the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro dissolved on June 5, 2006, and Serbia
became its own independent state, a new constitution of the Republic of Serbia entered into force
in November 2006. In 2007, the EU’s Progress Report noted that some provisions of the new
constitution were not fully in line with European standards, specifically political party control of
mandates of individual members of parliament, and the role of parliament in judicial
appointments.42 In addition, the EU reported that parliamentary elections were held in January

39

Nations in Transit 2006-Serbia. Rep. Freedom House. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2006/serbia> p. 1
40
Ibid. p. 1
41
Commission Staff Working Paper Report on the Preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to Negotiate a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union. Rep. no. SEC (2005) 478 Final. European
Commission, 12 Apr. 2005. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/sam_feasibility_report_staff_working_paper_en.pdf> p. 38
42
Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2007 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2007) 1435. European
Commission, 6 Nov. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/serbia_progress_reports_en.pdf> p. 6
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2007. Though the elections were observed to be free and fair, they exposed the need for better
regulation of party financing and a revision of voter registration.43
In 2010, the EU reported that the alignment of the constitution and constitutional law
with European standards was progressing. However, a draft Statute of Vojvodina, endorsed by
the Serbian parliament in 2009, has not yet been fully adopted.44 The Statute was adopted by the
Provincial Assembly of Vojvodina in October 2008, in line with constitutional requirements. The
Commission also noted that the electoral framework has only been partially revised and efforts
are needed to improve the legislative output of the Serbian parliament.
To help assist Serbia in stabilizing its democracy, the EU adopted a Partnership
Agreement on February 18, 2008. It called for the EU to ensure that the Serbian constitution is
being implemented according to European standards, that Serbia is cooperating with the ICTY,
and that Serbia is complying with its obligations under the SAA.45 The EU provided €185.7
million from 2002 to 2006 under CARDS and technical assistance is being provided by other
international organizations, such as the OSCE.46
Governance Issues
Corruption
Like Croatia, Serbia has encountered problems in the fight against corruption. In 2005,
Transparency International ranked Serbia 97th out of 158 countries in the Corruption Perception

43

Ibid. p. 7
Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2010 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2010) 1330. European
Commission, 9 Nov. 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/sr_rapport_2010_en.pdf> p. 7
45
European Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the
European Partnership with Serbia including Kosovo as Defined by United Nations Security Council Resolution
1244 of 10 June 1999 and Repealing Decision 2006/56/EC. Rep. no. Official Journal L080,19/03/2008 P.00460070. European Commission, 19 Mar. 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:080:0046:01:EN:HTML>
46
"CARDS Statistics 2000-2006."
44
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Index.47 In December 8, 2005, the National Anti-corruption Strategy was adopted by the Serbian
parliament and an action plan to implement the Strategy was adopted on December 2006. 48 By
January 2010, the Anti-Corruption Agency started its work. The agency is responsible for
preventive measures and the supervision of conflict of interest cases and funding of political
parties. The EU noted in their 2010 Progress Report that implementation of the Action Plan
continued to be slow and there was little progress in the investigation and prosecution of
corruption cases.49 The Anti-Corruption Agency was not yet fully staffed and lacked a permanent
premise and technical equipment. The existing legislation had significant problems and did not
provide the Agency with sufficient investigative and sanctioning powers to monitor party
funding effectively.50
There were also problems with the legal framework that regulates public procurement,
the privatization process and larger budgetary expenditures, which the Commission noted, did
not provide sufficient checks and balances to minimize the risk of corruption. A comprehensive
audit system was not yet in place, which represented an obstacle to the establishment of a duly
regulated public expenditure system capable of preventing systemic corruption.51
In addressing these problems, the EU provided €28.5 million since 2003.52 Table 4.7
shows the assistance provided under CARDS from 2003 to 2006. Table 4.8 shows the projects
and funding under the IPA.

47

Corruption Perception Index 2005. Rep. Transparency International. Web. 15 Mar. 2012
Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2007 Progress Report. p. 11
49
Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2010 Progress Report. p. 11
50
Ibid. p. 11
51
Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2007 Progress Report p. 11
52
Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011
48
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Table 4.7: CARDS Assistance to Fight Corruption-Serbia (million €)
2003
0
Overall Assistance
(Source: European Commission Financial Assistance:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm>)

2004
19

2005
2

2006
2.5

Table 4.8: IPA Projects to Fight Corruption-Serbia
Projects

Overall
Objective
and
Purpose

53

Fight against
corruption53

Capacity building of the Directorate
for Confiscated Property and
improving the system of Criminal
Asset Confiscation54
Objective
Objective
-Promote good
-Contribute to democracy and the rule
governance and
of law by suppressing organized crime
strengthen institutions in and corruption in accordance with
Serbia which are
EU/international standards and
instrumental in the fight Countering Money Laundering and
against corruption
Financing of Terrorism
(MONEYVAL)/Group of States
Purpose
against Corruption (GRECO)
-Contribute to reducing
the level of corruption
Purpose
by supporting the
-Enhance the institutional capacity and
operational functioning
efficient functioning of the Directorate
of a comprehensive
for Confiscated Property Management
agency that will
as well as other key institutions in the
coordinate the fight
search, seizure, management and
against corruption
confiscation of the proceeds from
crime in Serbia

Strengthening the
rule of law in Serbia55

Objective
-Contribute to good
governance in Serbia
by ensuring the rule of
law, efficient state
border
security, improving the
efficiency and
accountability of the
public sector, and
tackling
corruption as essential
elements of a
framework, within
which economies can
prosper
Purpose
Component I:
Implementation of
Justice Sector and anti
corruption policy
1. Subcomponent 1
(Direct agreement
with the World

Standard Summary Project Fiche-IPA Centralised Programmes Project Number 5: Fight against Corruption.
Rep. no. 2008/020-406. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2008/5-anti-corruption_en.pdf> p. 6
54
Standard Summary Project Fiche–IPA Centralised National Programme Project Number 1: Capacity Building of
the Directorate for Confiscated Property and Improving the System of Criminal Asset Confiscation. Rep. no.
2009/021-638. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2009/1_criminal_assets_confiscation.pdf> p. 2-14
55
Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA Centralised Programmes Project Number 1: Strengthening the Rule of
Law in Serbia. Rep. no. 2011/022-585. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2011/01_strengthening_the_rule_of_law_in_serbia.pdf> p. 17
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Table 4.8 Continued
Projects

Fight against
corruption

Capacity building of
the Directorate for
Confiscated Property
and improving the
system of Criminal
Asset Confiscation

Strengthening the rule of law in
Serbia

Bank): Support to
the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for
Justice Sector

Overall
Objective and
Purpose

Budget

€2.500.000 in
€2.500.000 in EU
EU contributions contributions

Implementation
Schedule

Contract Signed:
3Q 2009/Project
Completed: 3Q
2013

Contract Signed: 2Q
2009/Project
Completed: 2Q 2012

a. Support the Multi Donor
Trust Fund for Justice Sector
in the introduction of sector
wide approach in design,
programming and
implementation of justice
sector reform initiatives
2. Subcomponent 2 (Direct
agreement with the Council of
Europe): Strengthening the
capacitates of law enforcement
and judiciary in the fight against
corruption in Serbia
a. Improve the capacities and
quality of the implementation
of institutional reforms aimed
at preventing and combating
corruption
€2.000.000 in contributions from the
World Bank and €1.400.000 in
contributions from the Council of
Europe
Contract signed: 1Q 2012/Project
Completed 4Q 2015

(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Serbia <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidatecountries/serbia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>)

Minority Rights and Refugees
The Roma continue to face very difficult living conditions and discrimination in Serbia.
Roma find it difficult to obtain personal documents, hindering their access to the social security
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system, education, employment, and other services.56 A large portion of the Roma population
lives in extreme poverty and exclusion, and regularly faces discrimination and attacks. Over
eighty-percent of Roma children living in Roma establishments are poor and suffer from
discrimination and exclusion. On average, only around one third of Roma children complete
primary education.57 A national strategy for the improvement of the Status of Roma and a related
action plan were adopted in 2009. In the 2011 Progress Report, the EU expressed the need for
further funding of the strategy to improve its effectiveness.58 There is also no systematic
approach to the relocation of illegal Roma settlements, which is often conducted inappropriately,
resulting in serious violations of basic human rights.
As of January 2011, there are 73,608 refugees and 228,442 internally displaced persons
(IDPs) in Serbia.59 Around 800 refugees and 2,500 IDPs were accommodated in twenty-nine
collective centers.60 In 2002 a National Strategy for Resolving Issues of refugees and IDPs was
adopted and revised in March 2011. The Commission noted in the 2011 Progress Report that
around 97,000 IDPs remain in need of assistance for housing, employment and personal
identification documents, with Roma being the most disadvantaged segment of the IDP
population.61 To address these problems, the EU provided €114.65 million in assistance.62 Table
4.9 shows the overall amount under CARDS while Table 4.10 shows the projects and funding
under the IPA.
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Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2007 Progress Report p. 16
Ibid. p. 16
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Commission Staff Working Paper Analytical Report. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1208. European Commission, 12 Oct.
2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_analytical_rapport_2011_en.pdf> p. 32
59
"2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile-Serbia." UNHCR. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d9f6>
60
Commission Staff Working Paper Analytical Report. p. 32
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Ibid. p. 32
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Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011
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Table 4.9: CARDS Assistance to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Serbia (million €)
2003
4
Overall Assistance
(Source: European Commission Financial Assistance:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm>)

2004
51.5

2005
29.5

2006
0

Table 4.10: IPA Projects to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Serbia
Projects

Further support to
refugees and Internally
Displaced People (IDPs) in
Serbia63

Overall
Objective
and
Purpose

Objective
-Build durable solutions to
address the IDP/Refugee
Challenge
Purpose
1. Integrate refugees
through projects that
will develop
accommodation
solutions , employment
and income generation
activities
2. Support return/
reintegration
through cross-boundary
initiatives and crossborder initiatives
3. Contribute to the selfreliance of

63

Supporting access to
rights, employment and
livelihood enhancement of
refugees and IDPs in
Serbia64
Objective
-Contribute to resolving the
problems of refugees and
IDPs in Serbia through the
provision of adequate
support

Support to the
implementation of
strategies for IDPs,
refugees and returnees65

Purpose
-Promote the livelihood
improvement of the most
vulnerable IDPs and refugee
families through economic
and housing support,
information provision
and access to social services

Purpose
1. Integrate refugees,
improve living
conditions, and
reintegrate returnees
under the readmission
agreements
2. Facilitate the realization
of the rights of
refugees, IDPs, and
returnees under the

Objective
-Contribute to sound
implementation of strategies
for refugees, IDPs, and
returnees according to
Readmission Agreements

Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA Centralised Programmes Further Support to Refugees and IDPs in
Serbia. Rep. no. 2007/19322. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/support_to_refugees_and_idps_en.pdf> p. 1
64
Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA Centralised National Programmes Project Number 2: Supporting Access
to Rights, Employment and Livelihood Enhancement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Serbia.
Rep. no. 2009/021-638. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2009/2_refugees_and_idps.pdf> p. 9-10
65
Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA Centralised Programmes Project Number 09: Support to the
Implementation of Strategies for IDPs, Refugees and Returnees. Rep. no. 2011/022-585. European Commission.
Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2011/09_support_to_strategies_for_idps,_refugees_and_returnees.p
df> p. 2
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Table 4.10 Continued
Further support to
Projects
refugees and Internally
Displaced People (IDPs)
in Serbia

Overall
Objective and
Purpose

Budget

Implementation
Schedule

Supporting access to
rights, employment
and livelihood
enhancement of
refugees and IDPs in
Serbia

specifically targeted
refugees/IDPs through
socio economic support
packages and legal
assistance
4. Secure the full
implementation of the
Sarajevo Declaration
€10.000.000 in EU
€13.541.000
contributions
(€12.650.000 in EU
contributions and
€891.000 in national
contributions
Contract Signed: 2Q
Contract Signed: 1Q
2008/Project Completed:
2010/Project
3Q 2010
Completed: 4Q 2013

Support to the
implementation of
strategies for IDPs,
refugees and returnees

readmission
agreements through
legal assistance
3. Since a significant
number of returnees
and IDPs are Roma,
the project will benefit
this vulnerable group
€7.722.000 (€7.000.000 in
EU contributions and
€72.000 in national
contributions
Contract Signed: 4Q
2012/Project Completed:
3Q 2014

(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Serbia <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidatecountries/serbia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>)

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Of our three cases, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is the farthest on its path to European
accession. The EU established diplomatic relations once BiH declared independence from
Yugoslavia in 1992. Their relationship intensified once the war ended and the EU began to shift
its focus to the Western Balkans as a whole. The Roymaount Process began in December 1996.
It was the first such initiative that focused on the stabilization of South-East Europe.66 In June
1998, the EU-BiH Consultative Task Force was established and provided technical and expert
advice in the fields of the judiciary, education, media, administration, and economy. In 1999, the
EU initiated the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for five South-Eastern Europe,
66

Bedrudin Brljavac. "Assessing the European Criteria in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Litmus Test for the European
Union." Journal of Comparative Politics 5.1 (2012): 4-23 p. 7
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including BiH, and the SAP was confirmed by the Thessaloniki European Council as the EU
policy for the Western Balkans.67
Bosnia and Herzegovina signed their SAA agreement along with an Interim Agreement
on Trade and Trade-related issues (IA) on June 16, 2008 in Luxembourg. The IA entered into
force in July 2008 but its implementation is mixed. According to the latest European
Commission Progress Report (2011), BiH is in non compliance with the European Convention
on Human Rights and with the rules on State Aid.68 The SAA has been ratified by all EU
Member States but has not yet entered into force. Table 4.11 shows the overall assistance given
to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2003 to 2013.
Table 4.11 Bosnia and Herzegovina CARDS and IPA Assistance: 2003-2013 (million €)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
72
49.4
51 62.1 74.8 89.1 105.3 107.4 107.8 111.8
Overall Assistance 63
(Compiled from CARDS and IPA Financial Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/financialassistance/index_en.htm >)
a.
b.

For 2003-2006: Financial allocation was administered under CARDS.
For 2007-2013: Financial allocation was administered under the IPA

Transition to Democracy
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system is the product of the Dayton Peace Accords of
November 1995 which ended the war in Bosnia. BiH operates under institutional supervision as a loose
asymmetrical federation of autonomous entities: the centralized Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS),
the decentralized Bosniak and Croat-dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and
Brčko, a district with its own governing institutions.69 At the state level, BiH has a tripartite presidency
with one Bosniak representative, one Serb, and one Croat. Seventeen years after the Dayton Peace
67

Ibid. p. 7
Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1206 Final.
European Commission, 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ba_rapport_2011_en.pdf> p. 7
69
Core Document Forming Parts of the Reports of States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rep. no.
HRI/CORE/BIH/2011. United Nations International Human Rights Instruments, 2011. p. 16
68

67
Accords, BiH remains dependent on international involvement, especially the Office of the High
Representative (OHR), which is responsible for the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace
Accords.70
2006 was marked by two major events. First, in April 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
Parliamentary Assembly rejected a package of proposed constitutional amendments. The amendments
would have improved the functionality of the state and enhanced its capacity to negotiate with the EU,
and redistribute some competences.71 Second, presidential and parliamentary elections occurred on
October 2006. They were the first elections since the Dayton Peace Accords to be fully administered by
the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The elections were generally considered to be run in
accordance with international standards for democratic elections.72 However, Freedom House reported
that because of constitutional limitations and ethnicity-based nominations, the elections violated the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the obligations toward membership in the Council
of Europe.73

In 2010, the EU’s Progress Report noted that in autumn 2009, a joint EU-U.S. initiative
to help meet the minimum requirements of the EU accession process, improve the functionality
of the state, and align the Constitution with the ECHR was started. However, no agreement on a
way forward emerged.74
Recently, Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent major political turmoil. Until December
28, 2011, BiH was without a state-level government following their general elections in October
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Commission Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2007) 1430.
European Commission, 6 Nov. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/bosnia_herzegovina_progress_reports_en.pdf> p. 10
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Ibid. p. 10
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Nations in Transit 2007-Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rep. Freedom House. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2007/bosnia-and-herzegovina> p. 5
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Commission Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2010) 1331.
European Commission, 9 Nov. 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ba_rapport_2011_en.pdf> p. 8
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2010.75 Thus, during that time, no state-level legislation was adopted, including a state budget. In
the run-up and after the general election in October, 2011 nationalistic rhetoric continued. Legal
and political actions by the Republika Srpska challenged the authority of the High
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and BiHs state-level institutions, competencies, and
laws. On April 13, 2011, the Republika Srpska National Assembly adopted a series of
conclusions and a decision to hold a referendum on the powers of the High Representative for
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of BiHs state-level judicial institutions.76 The
conclusion rejected the authority of the High Representative to impose legislation.77 Following a
visit on May 13, 2011 to BiH by the European Union High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Ms. Catherine
Ashton, the Republika Srpska authorities voted on June 1, 2011 to annul the decisions on holding
a referendum and review the previously adopted conclusions. However, in his fortieth report,
High Representative for BiH, Valentin Inzko, noted that the conclusions adopted remain in force
and appear to shape the polices of RS. 78
In addition, several high-level officials of Republika Srpska called for the separation of
RS from BiH, threatening the stability of the country. For example, the RS President asserted
that the Bosniak people can only build their identity by destroying others and other officials have

75

"Breakthrough on Bosnian Impasse." Balkan Insight. 28 Dec. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/end-of-political-stalemate-in-bosnia>
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called for a referendum for succession.79 In response, some Bosniak political leaders warned of
possible conflict if there was an attempt to divide the country. Some Federation politicians called
for the creation of a Croat dominated entity within BiH.80
In July 2011, just before the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995,
several high-level politicians from RS made statements praising the perpetrators of this crime,
including Radovan Karadžić, who is currently awaiting trial at the ICTY.81 Some politicians also
denied that the genocide actually took place.
Like Serbia, to help assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in stabilizing their democracy, the EU
adopted a Partnership Agreement on February 18, 2008. It called inter alia, for the EU to provide
BiHs parliament with technical resources and personnel, help establish mechanisms for political,
legislative, and technical cooperation between State and the Entities, and help amend the
electoral legislation to ensure full compliance with ECHR and the Council of Europe postaccession commitments.82 The EU provided €55 million from 2002 to 2006 under CARDS and
technical assistance is being provided by other international organization, such as the OSCE.83
Governance Issues
Corruption
th

In 2005, Transparency International ranked Bosnia and Herzegovina 88 out of 158

countries in the Corruption Perception Index.84 In May 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a
National Anti-Corruption Strategy and action plan but it was insufficiently implemented and had
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coordination problems between the Entities. Therefore a new Strategy against Corruption 2009-2014 and
the related Action Plan were adopted.85 However, its implementation had been limited due to a lack of
political will and institutional capacity, the 2011 Progress Report noted.86 On January 2007, a third
evaluation report adopted by the GRECO underlined the need to enforce the legal framework and
improve the coordination and training of the agencies involved in fighting corruption. The Commission
noted that BiH has only done little to follow through on the recommendations of the report to improve
anti-corruption legislation.87 In addition effective investigation, prosecution, and conviction of corruption
cases remained low. When corruption cases did occur, they were often minor cases, while high level
corruption cases have ended in the dropping of the charges, acquittals, or suspended sentences.88 To

address these problems the EU provided €39 million in funding.89 Table 4.12 shows the overall
amount under CARDS while 4.13 shows the projects and funding under the IPA.
Table 4.12: CARDS Assistance to Fight Corruption-Bosnia and Herzegovina (million €)
2003
10
Overall Assistance
(Source: European Commission Financial Assistance:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm>)

85

2004
23.5

2005
0

2006
0

Commission Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2009) 1338.
European Commission, 14 Oct. 2009. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ba_rapport_2009_en.pdf> p. 14
86
Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1206
Final. European Commission, 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ba_rapport_2011_en.pdf> p. 14
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89
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Table 4.13: IPA Projects to Fight Corruption-Bosnia and Herzegovina
Projects

Support to the State Court and
Prosecutor’s Office of BiH to
fight war crimes and organized
crime90

Overall
Objective
and
Purpose

Objective
1. Build sustainable institutional
capacity at the State level by
strengthening the Court of
BiH and the Prosecutor’s
Office of BiH
2. The Strategic framework is to
improve the overall
effectiveness an impartiality
of these institutions through
their ability to consolidate the
rule of law and address
violations of international
humanitarian law committed
during Bosnia war between
1992 and 1995 in addition to
the prosecution of organized
crime, economic crime and
corruption cases
Purpose
-Build sustainable professional
and technical capacities for
prosecuting and investigating
cases related to war crimes,
economic crime, organized crime,
and corruption

90

Strengthening the
capacities of BiH
institutions to combat
and prevent
corruption91
Objective
-Strengthen the
capacities of BiH
institutions to enforce
accountability and
effectively fight and
prevent corruption
Purpose
1. Strengthen the
institutional and
administrative
capacities of the
anti-corruption body
in order to enable it
to fulfill its mandate
2. Improve the anticorruption capacities
and cooperation
mechanisms of
institutions whose
mandate is to
combat and prevent
corruption on
different
administrative levels
3. Reinforce corruption

Implementation of the
Anti-Corruption
Strategy and Action
Plan92
Objective
-Contribute to the fight
against corruption and
effective corruption
prevention in BiH
Purpose
-Support the institutions in
BiH to effectively
implement effectively the
Anti-Corruption Strategy
and its Action Plan in
cooperation with civil
societies and business
associations

IPA National Programme 2008 Part I-Bosnia and Herzegovina: Project Fiche 2: Support to the State Court and
Prosecutor’s Office of BiH to Fight War Crimes and Organised Crime. Rep. no. 2008/20-111. European
Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/bosnia_and_herzegovina/ipa/2008/ipa_2008_part_i_02_state_court_en.pdf> p.
13
91
IPA National Programme 2009 Part II – Bosnia and Herzegovina Fiche 6 "Anti-Corruption" Rep. no. 2009 / 021650. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/bosnia_and_herzegovina/ipa/2009/ipa_2009_part_ii_06_anticorruption_en.pdf> p. 2
92
IPA National Programme 2010–Bosnia and Herzegovina Fiche 5 "Anti-Corruption"Rep. no. 2010 / 022-259.
European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/bosnia_and_herzegovina/ipa/2010/part1/pf_05_ipa_2010_anti_corruption_2010.04.29_en.pdf> p. 11-12
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Table 4.13 Continued
Projects

Support to the State
Court and
Prosecutor’s Office of
BiH to fight war
crimes and organized
crime

Overall Objective and
Purpose

Budget
Implementation
Schedule

€3.000.000 in EU
contributions
Contract Signed: 2Q
2009/Project
Completed: 2Q 2010

Strengthening the
capacities of BiH
institutions to combat
and prevent
corruption
prevention capacities of
public institutions and
law enforcement
agencies through more
extensive training and
the creation of
sustainable training
capacities
€500.000 in EU
contributions
Contract Signed: 2Q
2010/Project
Completed: 4Q 2011

Implementation of the
Anti-Corruption
Strategy and Action
Plan

€2.000.000 in EU
contributions
Contract Signed: 3Q
2011/Project
Completed: 3Q 2013

(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/financialassistance/index_en.htm>)

Minority Rights and Refugees
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are seventeen officially recognized minorities. The
three constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs do not constitute minorities.93 Because
minorities do not belong to the three constituent peoples, they have been excluded from
representation in the State-level House of Peoples and the Presidency.94 The National Minority
Council was established in February 2008 to act as an advisor to the Parliamentary Assemble.
However, the 2011 EU Progress Report noted their influence has remained limited due to the
lack of political and financial support.95
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The most vulnerable minority group in BiH is the Roma.96 Discrimination against Roma
persists in access to housing, social services, education, and employment. In September 2008,
Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Decade for Roma inclusion 2005-2015. At the same time,
BiH adopted an Action Plan on Roma housing, health, and employment. The Action plan
complements the 2004 Action Plan on the Education Needs of Roma and Members of Other
National Minorities.97 By 2011, the EU reported that there has been little progress on
implementing the action plan on health while the action plan on the education needs of Roma
needed to be stepped up.98
As of January 2011, 113,365 IDPs, including 7,492 in collective centers, and 7,000
refugees were living in BiH.99 Refugees continue to face discrimination in access to
employment, health care, pension rights, and social protection. To address these problems, the
EU provided €54.3 million in funding.100 Table 4.14 shows the overall amount under CARDS
while Table 4.15 shows the projects under the IPA.
Table 4.14: CARDS Assistance to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Bosnia and
Herzegovina (million €)
2003
19.5
Overall Assistance
(Source: European Commission Financial Assistance:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/keydocuments/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm>)

96

2004
7.5

2005
3.1

2006
2.5
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Final. European Commission, 5 Nov. 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
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100
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Table 4.15: IPA Projects to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Bosnia and Herzegovina
Projects

Enhancing the Social
Protection and Inclusion
System for Children in
Bosnia and Herzegovina101

Support for Vulnerable
Groups in Bosnia and
Herzegovina102

Overall
Objective and
Purpose

Objective
-Development of a fiscally
sustainable and effective
social safety net and the
establishment of a
harmonized, well targeted,
efficient, and sustainable
social protection system

Objective
-Combat social exclusion in
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Purpose
-Support minority and
vulnerable groups concerns in
particular services, legislative
matters, and socio-economic
development that is in line
with BiH’s own sectoral
reform and development
strategies taking into account
the Mid-term Development
Strategy and EU Integration
Strategy for BiH

Purpose
-Develop an integrated Social
Protection and Inclusion
Strategy that will support
minority and excluded groups
by strengthening public
services, legislative
frameworks, and influence
socio-economic
developments in coordination
with BiH’s own reform and
development strategies

Enhancing the social
protection and
inclusion system for
vulnerable groups –
Phase III103
Objective
-Contribute to the
development of a
fiscally sustainable and
effective social safety
net and to the
establishment of a
harmonized, welltargeted, efficient, and
sustainable social
protection system

Purpose
-Support key
government partners in
establishing a countryled process for the
development and
implementation of a
sustainable strategy for
integrated social
protection and inclusion
of children
and families in BiH
€1.300.000 in EU
€1.955.555 (€1.900.000
€1.650.000 (€1.400.000
Budget
contributions
in EU contributions and
in EU contributions and
€55.555 in private
€250.000 in national
contributions)
contributions)
Contract
Signed:
1Q
Contract
Signed:
3Q
Contract Signed: 4Q
Implementation
2008/Project Completed: 1Q
2009/Project Completed: 3Q
2010/Project Completed:
Schedule
2009
2011
4Q 2011
(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina < http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potentialcandidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>)
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In the next chapter, I will assess whether progress has been made in their transition to
democracy including in the areas of corruption and the protection of minority rights and
refugees. The aim is to evaluate whether EU assistance correlates to improvements in the
democratic areas.
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Chapter 5: Critique of EU Approach in the Western Balkans
I am now going to look at whether the EU’s projects in the Western Balkans have had
any positive effects on the areas they were designed to impact.
Fight against Corruption
Croatia has increased the transparency and integrity of its public administration and state
owned companies. The government has also stepped up the fight against corruption and
improved interagency cooperation. However, the Commission noted that many high level
corruption cases have not yet been concluded and Croatia needs to start a track record of
successfully handling organized crime and corruption cases. Also, Croatia needs more
experience in implementing newly adopted legislation and the implementing structures have to
be further strengthened.1
Regarding Serbia, the Commission paints a somewhat bleaker picture. The
Commissioners noted that Serbia has put in place a legal and institutional framework, including
an Anti-Corruption Agency and a new law on funding political parties to fight corruption. Also
steps have been taken for the specialization of certain law enforcement agencies to fight
corruption and a large number of cases have been prosecuted.2 However, the Commission did
remark that corruption remains prevalent in many areas and continues to be a serious problem.
There needs to be stronger political will and law enforcement agencies need to take a more proactive approach in investigating and prosecuting corruption. Finally the Commission believes

1
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that the Serbian judiciary needs to build up a better track record of final convictions, including
high level cases.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH), according to the Commission, is “still at the early stage
in the fight against corruption.”4 Corruption is still very prevalent in many areas and remains a
serious threat throughout the private and public sectors. Though a legal framework is in place,
corruption continues to negatively impact all spheres of life, economic development, and the rule
of law.5 The third GRECO evaluation, launched in January 2007 and published in May 2011,
highlighted a number of deficiencies in the legal framework to fight corruption. Specifically,
there is a lack of harmonization if the four existing Criminal Codes in the country. The lack of
consistency was noticeable with the criminalization of bribery and jurisdiction.6
Looking at independent sources, the actual picture of corruption in Croatia, Serbia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina is bleaker then what the Commission reports. According to a Gallup
House Poll conducted in cooperation with the European Fund for the Balkans in 2010, 89% of
Croatians believed that corruption is widespread in government and 93% believe that corruption
is widespread in business in 2010.7 In both cases, this was an increase since 2006. In 2006, 77%
of Croatians believe that corruption was widespread in government. In 2009, the percentage of
respondents increased to 87% and then to 89% in 2010.8 For business perception in 2006, the
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percentage of Croatian respondents was 83%. The percentage increased to 92% in 2009 and then
increased again to 93% in 2010.9
In Serbia, unlike in Croatia, the percentage of respondents saying corruption was
widespread in government and business decreased from 2009 to 2010. In 2006, 71% of
respondents believed that corruption was widespread in government and 82% believed it was
widespread in business.10 In 2009 for government, the percentage increased to 84%, then
decreased to 81% in 2010. For businesses in 2006, 82% of respondents believed corruption to be
widespread. Following the corruption in government trend, the percentage of respondents
increased in 2009 to 91% and then decreased to 88% in 2010.11
Within Bosnia and Herzegovina there was a striking difference in the perception of
government corruption between the two Bosnian entities: while in the Federation 93% of
respondents were convinced that corruption was common at the governmental level, the
corresponding figure for the Republika Srpska was 71% in 2010.12 BiH follows the same trend as
Serbia in terms of the perception of corruption in business. In 2006, the percentage of
respondents was 86%. This increased to 90% in 2009 and then decreased to 87% in 2010.13
Chart 5.1 shows the Gallup results in terms of the percentage of respondents who believe
corruption is widespread throughout government while Chart 5.2 shows the percentage of
respondents who believe corruption is widespread within business. Overall, then, in every
country about 85% of respondents agree that corruption is rampant in 2006-2010. This is an
extremely high percentage.

9

Ibid. p. 35
Ibid. p. 35
11
Ibid. p. 35
12
Ibid. p. 35
13
Ibid. p. 35
10

79

Chart 5.1: Percentage of Respondents who Believe
Corruption is Widespread throughout the Government
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Chart 5.2: Percentage of Respondents who Believe
Corruption is Widespread within Business
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The perception of higher corruption is corroborated by a 2011 United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on corruption in the Western Balkans and its impact on
people’s everyday lives. Respondents were asked whether they perceive corruption as having
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increased, remained stable, or decreased since 2007. 30% of Croatians perceive that corruption
has increased, 55% perceive that corruption has remained the same, and 12% believe it has
decreased.14 In Serbia, the percentages were 32%, 52%, and 12%.15 BiH had the highest
percentage of respondents who believe that corruption has increased, 45%. 47% believe that
corruption has remained the same and only 5% believe it has decreased.16
Transparency International published a Global Corruption Barometer report in 2010. The
report is a survey that assesses the general public attitudes and experiences of corruption. The
barometer asked the question, “To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this
country to be affected by corruption (1-not at all corrupt, 5 extremely corrupt)”.17 The
institutions were the judiciary, media, business, parliament/legislature, and political parties.
Looking at these three charts below, we see that for all three countries, respondents
believed that the judiciary is the most corrupt, followed by political parties, and the parliament.
From year to year, the perception of corruption among the five institutions has remained
relatively the same. Compared to 2007, the results for 2010 remained relatively the same. For
Croatia in 2010, the judiciary scored the highest in corruption decreasing by 0.2 in 2007(4.3 in
2007 to 4.1 in 2010). Businesses received the next highest score, though the score decreased by
0.1 from 2007 (4 in 2007 to 3.9 in 2010). 18 For Serbia, the perception of corruption in political
parties increased by 0.2 (4 in 2007 to 4.2 in 2010) and the judiciary increased by 0.1 (3.8 in 2007
to 3.9 in 2010) between 2007 and 2010.19 For BiH, the perception of corruption in all institutions
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decreased between 2007 and 2010. The judiciary decreased by 0.7 (4.2 in 2007 to 3.5 in 2010
while political parties decreased by 0.3 (4.4 in 2007 to 4.1 in 2010).20

Chart 5.3: Croatia-Global Corruption Barometer
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Question asked “To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this country to be affected by
corruption”(1-not at all corrupt, 5 extremely corrupt)

Chart 5.4: Serbia-Global Corruption Barometer
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Chart 5.5: Bosnia-Herzegovina-Global Corruption
Barometer
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corruption”(1-not at all corrupt, 5 extremely corrupt)

Further substantiating our claim that the EU’s policies have done little to stifle
corruption, we will look at Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The
CPI ranks countries according to their perceived levels of public-sector corruption. For the 2011
report, data was calculated from seventeen sources from thirteen institutions, including the
World Bank, Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit.21 The questions include
bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and
the effectiveness of public-sector anti-corruption efforts. Countries are scored from 0-10, with a
zero meaning highly corrupt and a ten meaning very clean.22 Included with the CPI score and
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rank are the number of sources and the confidence range for each country. The CPI 2011
evaluates 183 countries. Below are the results for the three case studies in the 2011 CPI:23
Table: 5.1: Corruption Perception Index 2011
Country

Score
(1-10)
4
3.3
3.2

Croatia
Serbia
Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Rank (of 183
countries)
66
86
91

Sources

Confidence Range

10
7
6

3.7-4.4
3-3.6
3-3.4

(Source: Transparency International-2011 Corruption Perception Index
<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/>)

Looking at the previous CPI’s since 2007, we see that the rankings have remained steady,
although they have to be interpreted with caution because the number of countries changed.24
Chart 5.3 is a summary of scores since 2007 (rankings not included).

Chart 5.6:2007-2011 Corruption Perception Index
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Protection of Minority Rights and Refugees
In dealing with minority rights and refugees, the Commission noted in its 2011 Progress
Report that Croatia has made progress and that cooperation between political representatives of
minorities and the government remains good.25 Though financial funding for minority
organizations decreased by 1.25 percent, conditions for the effective implementation of the
constitutional act on the rights of national minorities have improved. The number of racist or
xenophobic incidents has decreased and in terms of those incidents that do occur, the police and
political response level has increased.26 While the numbers of attacks on the Serb minority have
decreased, they face difficulty in employment. In regards to dealing with the Roma, the
Commission noted improvements in access to education and provision of adequate housing.
However, Roma still face much discrimination in the areas of education, social protection,
health, employment, and housing.27 The Roma continue to face a problem regarding their
residence and citizenship. Finally, the report remarked that Croatia has made good progress on
refugee return. The Commission estimates that 132,872 refugees (mostly Serbian) have returned
to Croatia, which is approximately half of those who fled the country up until 1995.28 Croatia has
its Action Plan on the Housing Care Programme for returning refugees and has met its 2009
target for building 2,070 homes.
Regarding Serbia, the Commission noted that the legal and policy framework for human
rights and the protection of minorities is in line with European standards. Implementing the
legislation needed to protect human rights does need to be stepped up though. In addition, while
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the Commission noted that human rights are generally respected in Serbia, the situation
regarding refugees and internally displaced people remains a very high concern.29
Finally, the Commission reported that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Roma continue to face
discrimination and harsh living conditions. Also, action plans on health and education need to be
implemented better and access to pension rights, health care, and social protection for refugees
needs to be improved.30 Refugees continue to face difficulties with economic reintegration,
access to health care, social protection, pensions, and employment.
Results from independent sources show a slightly less optimistic picture. In their January
2012 report, Human Rights Watch noted that Croatia’s progress on human rights lagged behind
its commitments. Despite the arrests of a high ranking fugitive, Goran Hadzic in July 2011,
Croatia is still having difficulty in handling war crimes accountability. In 2011, the number of
war crime trials conducted in absentia increased. Despite a plan by the Chief State Attorney to
revise past convictions given in absentia, in the first eight months of 2011, twenty of the thirtythree active war crimes trials took place at least partially in absentia.31 In addition, war crimes
trials continue to be held in regular district courts instead of four courts designed especially for
war crimes trials. According to Amnesty International, there are 540 war crime cases in 2011
still at the pre-investigative stage, with an average of eighteen war crime cases being concluded
each year.32 At this pace, most of those allegedly responsible will never face trial.
According to UNHCR estimates, there are 26,388 people that are of concern in Croatia as
of December 2011. This number is broken down to represent 786 registered refugees, 807
29
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Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report p. 20
31
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asylum seekers, 2,059 internally displaced people (IDPs), 1,720 stateless people, and 21,016
other persons of concern.33 The number of returnees to Croatia from Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Serbia/Montenegro has decreased every year since 1998. In 2011 there were 305 returns to
Croatia, down from 538 in 2010.34 In addition, the number of IDPs has decreased at a much
smaller rate. Below is the number of IDPs since 2007:35
Table 5.2: Internally Displaced Persons in Croatia (IDPs)
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Number of IDPs
2,873
2,497
2,285
2,128
2,059

(Source UNHCR Representation in Republic of Croatia:

<http://www.unhcr.hr/eng/images/stories/news/stats2012/unhcr_statistical_report_december_201
1.pdf>)
According to Human Rights Watch, there have been ongoing delays for governmentsponsored housing programs for returnees. Only 286 applications were approved from June 2010
to June 2011.36 Also, as of the end of June 2011, 23,568 out of 24,901 pension requests for
recognition of wartime work in formerly rebel-held areas, had been processed, with only fiftyseven percent of them being resolved positively. Human Rights Watch argues that this continues
to compromise the financial security of returnees.37
In Serbia, according to both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, little
progress has been made on human rights issues. Roma continue to suffer from discrimination
and attacks. For example in March 2011, a Roma boy was repeatedly beaten outside his high
school. A similar incident occurred in May, when three individuals beat a young Roma adult in a
33
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Belgrade bus.38 Forced evictions of Romani people also continue across Belgrade. In April 2011,
thirty eight Romani families were evicted from their informal settlement in Ĉukarica
municipality. The majority of them were sent back to Serbia where they came from.39 In October
2011, thirty-six Roma, including seventeen children, were evicted from their homes in Belgrade.
Five of the families were later relocated in containers, which did not meet international standards
for adequate housing.40
According to UNHCR, Serbia has about 73,608 refugees, one of the largest displaced
populations in Europe. They have approximately 228,442 IDPs from Kosovo, of whom 97,000
still need assistance according to an IDP Needs Assessment Survey done by the Serbian
Commissariat for Refugees and UNHCR in 2011.41 Also, the number of asylum seekers
registered in Serbia rose dramatically, from 522 in 2010 to 2,134 in 2011.42 This rise is attributed
to an influx of migrants through Greece, Turkey, and FYROM.
In their 2012 country summary, Human Rights Watch noted that BiH again failed to
implement a 2009 European Court of Human Rights ruling (Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and
Herzegovina) ordering the country to amend its constitution to eliminate ethnic discrimination in
the national tri-partite presidency and House of Peoples.43 The court ruled that BiHs constitution
violated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by discriminating against leading
members of the Jewish and Roma communities in political life solely based on their ethnicity.
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On March 15, 2012, BiHs parliament missed a Council of Europe deadline to propose
constitutional reforms to end ethnic discrimination in the constitution.44
Although more Roma children were enrolled in primary and secondary education in
2011, they still attend school at lower rates than their peers and the ninety-nine percent
unemployment rate for Roma in 2011 meant that those that completed school have little chance
of finding work.45 Also, at their seventy-seventh session in August 2010, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), expressed concern about the continued
discrimination of Roma in access to adequate housing, health care, employment, social security,
and education. 46
Finally, strategies to support returnees have done little to stop their declining numbers.
According to UNHCR, only 146 refugees and 177 IDPs returned to their areas of origin in the
first six months of 2011.47 As of mid 2011, there were 113,365 registered IDPs.48 The
impediments for returnees according to UNHCR, are the same as in previous years: lack of
economic opportunity, inadequate housing, and a reluctance to return to areas where residents
would be an ethnic minority.
Democracy and Rule of Law as a Whole
Taking a broad view of the status of democracy and the rule of law in the Western
Balkans, we see that little progress has been made and in some cases, the situation has gotten
worse. Every year, Freedom House publishes its Nations in Transit Report. The most recent one

44

"Second Class Citizens." Human Rights Watch. 4 Apr. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.hrw.org/node/106194/section/3> p. 3
45
"Country Summary Bosnia and Herzegovina." Human Rights Watch
46
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Rep. no. A/65/18. United Nations, 2010.
Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/459/21/PDF/G1045921.pdf?OpenElement> p. 25
47
"2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile-Bosnia and Herzegovina." UNHCR. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d766>
48
Ibid.

89
was in 2011, which covering twenty-nine countries from Central Europe to Central Asia. Ratings
are done in seven categories: national democratic process, electoral process, civil society,
independent media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and
corruption.49 The scores are averaged and a final democracy score is given. The ratings are based
on a scale of one to seven, with one representing the highest and seven the lowest level of
democratic progress. The democracy score (one to seven), defined the following regime types:
1.00-2.99-consolidated democracy; 3.00-3.99-semi-consolidated democracy; 4.00-4.99transitional or hybrid regimes; 5.00-5.99-semi-consoldated authoritarian regimes; and 6.00-7.00
consolidated authoritarian regimes.50
From 2007 to 2011, both Croatia and Serbia were identified as semi-consolidated
democracies while Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified as a transitional hybrid regime. A
semi-consolidated democracy means that the country meets relatively high standards for the
selection of national leaders but exhibits some weaknesses in their defense of political rights and
civil liberties. A transitional or hybrid regime means that the country meets only minimum
standards for the selection of national leaders. Democratic institutions are weak and extensive
challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist. Also, the likelihood for a
sustainable, liberal democracy is unclear. 51 Below are the results from each country from 20072011:
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Table 5.3: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2007-2011 Croatia

Electoral Process
Civil Society
Independent Media
National Democratic
Governance
Local democratic Governance
Judicial Framework and
Independence
Corruption
Democracy Score

2007
3.25
2.75
4.00
3.50

2008
3.25
2.75
3.75
3.25

2009
3.25
2.75
4.00
3.50

2010
3.25
2.75
4.00
3.50

2011
3.25
2.50
4.00
3.50

3.75
4.25

3.75
4.25

3.75
4.25

3.75
4.25

3.75
4.25

4.75
3.75

4.50
3.64

4.50
3.71

4.50
3.71

4.25
3.64

(Compiled from Freedom House- Nations in Transit 2007-2011-Croatia
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit>)

Looking at these scores, we see that the democracy score for Croatia has remained relatively
stable except in 2011 when it decreased a little bit. The corruption score decreased while
electoral process and judicial framework and independence scores remained unchanged. 52 The
scores signify that the EUs policies have not done much to neither help nor hurt Croatia.
Table 5.4: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2007-2011 Serbia
Electoral Process
Civil Society
Independent Media
National Democratic
Governance
Local democratic Governance
Judicial Framework and
Independence
Corruption
Democracy Score

2007
3.25
2.75
3.50
3.75

2008
3.25
2.75
3.75
4.00

2009
3.25
2.75
3.75
4.00

2010
3.25
2.50
4.00
3.75

2011
3.25
2.25
4.00
3.75

3.75
4.25

3.75
4.50

3.75
4.50

3.50
4.50

3.50
4.50

4.50
3.68

4.50
3.79

4.50
3.79

4.50
3.71

4.25
3.64

(Compiled from Freedom House- Nations in Transit 2007-2011-Serbia
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit>)

Looking at these results for Serbia, we see the same results as Croatia. The corruption score
decreased while electoral process and judicial framework and independence score remained

52
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unchanged. From 2010 to 2011, the national democratic governance score remained
unchanged.53
Table 5.5: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2007-2011 Bosnia and Herzegovina
Electoral Process
Civil Society
Independent Media
National Democratic
Governance
Local democratic Governance
Judicial Framework and
Independence
Corruption
Democracy Score

2007
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.75

2008
3.00
3.50
4.25
5.00

2009
3.00
3.50
4.50
5.00

2010
3.25
3.50
4.50
5.25

2011
3.25
3.50
4.75
5.25

4.75
4.00

4.75
4.00

4.75
4.00

4.75
4.00

4.75
4.25

4.25
4.04

4.25
4.11

4.50
4.18

4.50
4.25

4.50
4.32

(Compiled from Freedom House- Nations in Transit 2007-2011-Bosnia and Herzegovina
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit>)

BiH received the worst scores, and its democracy score has increased each year since 2007.
BiH’s received the highest score due to its lack of democratic governance and critical reforms.54
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Croatia is listed as a
“flawed democracy” and defined as “countries that have free and fair elections, even if there are
problems basic civil liberties will be respected. 55 However, there are significant weaknesses in
other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political
culture and low levels of political participation.”56 The index is based on the ratings for sixty
indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a
rating on a zero to ten scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five
category indexes.57 The higher the number, the higher the democracy index.
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Croatia ranks 53 out of 167 countries, with an overall democracy index of 6.73. In the
respective categories, Croatia scores the highest on the electoral process and the lowest in
political culture.58 Croatia has a 9.17 in electoral processes and pluralism; 5.71 in functioning of
government; 5.56 in political participation; 5.00 in political culture; and an 8.24 in civil liberties.
In comparison with the 2010 index, Croatia has the same rank (53) but a slightly lower score
(6.81 in 2010 versus 6.73 in 2011).59
Serbia is considered a flawed democracy with an index of 6.33 (ranked 64 out of 167).
Breaking down the score, Serbia has a 9.17 in electoral process and pluralism; 4.64 in
functioning of government; 6.11 in political participation; 4.38 in political culture; and 7.35 in
civil liberties.60 In comparison with 2010, Serbia’s index has remained the same though it went
down one in rank (65 in 2010 to 64 in 2011).61
Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a hybrid regime, with an index rank score
of 5.24 (ranked 95 out of 167). Breaking down the score, BiH has a 6.92 in electoral process and
pluralism; 3.29 in functioning government; 3.33 in political participation; 5.00 in political
culture; and 7.65 in civil liberties.62 Comparing the 2010 score with 2011, we see that in 2011,
the index decreased (5.32 in 2010 to 5.24 in 2011).63
In summary, the results of our findings show despite the financial assistance the EU has
given towards the Western Balkans, these countries have a long way to go in improving
democracy and the rule of law. Conditions have not worsened but they have not improved. They
have been relatively constant. This is indicated by the numerous independent rankings, reports,
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and opinion polls we looked at. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy
Index, Croatia and Serbia are listed as a “flawed democracies” and Bosnia and Herzegovina is a
“hybrid regime.”64 From the start of Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) funding in 2007, their
rankings have remained relatively the same.
Regarding corruption, all three states still have major problems combating it. Though two
states, Croatia and Serbia received lower scores in 2011 from Transparency International than
they did in 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s score remained the same. Looking at the scores
since the IPA was established they have remained relatively constant. 65 Opinion polls indicate
that the general public believes that corruption is widespread in both government and business.
Regarding the protection of minority rights and refugees, we see that little has been done
regarding the protection of the Roma in all three countries. Also, the programs that tried to
support returnees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) have done little to stop their declining
numbers. The most troubling situation was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where due to
inflammatory rhetoric a government was not formed for over a year following their general
elections in October 2010.66
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Chapter 6: Proposals for Strengthening Conditionality and Conclusion
In this chapter, I will conclude by providing some specific recommendations for improving
EU conditionality. These are based on expert analysis and collected and summarized here.
Looking at the results, there are a number of ways the EU can better strengthen their
conditionality towards the Western Balkans. First, the EU should stand firm on conditionality
and only allow countries to become members if they are politically and technically ready. The
EU currently refers to the need to only accept members when they are ready, in their
Enlargement Strategy Reports. The most recent reference to rigorous conditionality was in the
2008-2009 Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges. The report stated that “the EU should be
ready to accelerate their pre-accession preparations, as soon as they meet the necessary
conditions, and to ensure that the region continues to benefit from the highest level of political
and economic treatment in line with the SAP.”1 A more explicit reference to strong
conditionality is found in the 2005 Enlargement Strategy. In it the Commission stated that:
The EU must remain rigorous in demanding fulfillment of its criteria, but fair in duly
rewarding progress. Aspirant countries can only proceed from one stage of the process to the
next once they have met the conditions for that stage. Moreover, the Commission is prepared
to recommend the suspension of progress in case of a serious and persistent breach of the
EU’s fundamental principles, or if a country fails to meet essential requirements at any stage.
Such requirements include cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY).2
Though the EU claims to follow conditionality, they have used enlargement policy as a
diplomatic tool. For example, in April 2008, the EU decided to sign a Stabilization and
1

Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament Enlargement Strategy and Main
Challenges 2008-2009. Rep. no. COM(2008) 674 Final. European Commission, 5 Nov. 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2012.
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_incl_country_conclu_en.pdf> p. 8
2
Communication from the Commission 2005 Enlargement Strategy. Rep. no. COM (2005) 561 Final. European
Commission, 9 Sept. 2005. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0561:FIN:EN:PDF> p. 3

95
Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia even though Serbia did not fulfill its obligation to
cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The
signing of the SAA was seen by many experts as an opportunity to influence the 2008
parliamentary elections to provide a boost for the pro EU parties, amid a polarized political
climate in Serbia, and in the wake of the Kosovo declaration of independence and its recognition
by a number of EU member states.3
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the EU called explicitly for the unification of the police
forces as a prerequisite for signing a SAA, it weakened its conditionality when faced with a
strong internal reaction from Bosnian Serbs that threatened to derail the whole association
process. In the end, the agreement between the two was an accommodation between the different
internal views in Bosnia and EU, and foresaw the setting-up of some state-level police
coordination bodies without immediately affecting the autonomy of the two forces.4
The Balkan people and officials are confused by contradictory statements made by EU
representatives and vague EU progress reports. For example, Reuter news agency reported in
October 2008, that France and Germany were trying to block the European Commission from
setting the date for the end of accession talks with Croatia not because the country did not fulfill
its obligations, but because Germany and France wanted to wait until all twenty-seven members
ratified the Lisbon Treaty.5 This occurred despite a pledge from Commission President Jose
Manuel Barroso to Croatia’s Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, to give Croatia a provisional accession
schedule. Citizens of the Western Balkans expect the EU to act as a single body and are
disappointed when European foreign policy is adjusted to the requirements of one
3
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uncompromising state.6 When the EU hesitates on its commitments, it undermines the credibility
and effectiveness of the EU’s projects and instruments.
The EU must not make the same mistake in accepting members too early as they did in
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. In both cases, their accession was not of the result of an objective
assessment of their compliance with EU conditionalities, but rather a reflection of wider security
and political imperatives. For example, negotiations with Bulgaria were to some extent timed to
provide the Irish Presidency of the Council with a “success” in case the negotiations on the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe could not be finalized on its watch.7 In addition,
the entanglement of the Romanian and Bulgarian EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) with the rising crisis in Kosovo and the unresolved issue of Turkey’s application
produced a powerful incentive for the revision of the EU’s enlargement strategy.8
The enlargement strategy should be based on political consensus from both the EU and the
Western Balkans. A policy based on broad consensus adds credibility to the enlargement
process. It helps moderate possible deterioration, such as political crises in some countries and
helps prepare the population of the region for EU membership.9 In addition to coherence,
conditionality should be based on country tailored strategies, ensuring that accession does not
move at the pace of the slowest candidate. Lowering standards in order to increase the pace of
progress gives the impression that making progress on the accession track is more important to
EU officials than it is to accession countries.

6

Odile Perrot, "Multiple Bilateral Issues: Obstacles to the Thessaloniki Agenda." Accession of the Western Balkans
to the EU: Evaluating a Process (2010): 14-17. p. 15
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The EU should use its screening reports to clearly communicate to the government and civil
society actors in both member and applicant countries, where the enlargement process of a
particular country stands, how far it has to go, and what benefits it can expect on the way. Clear
to-do lists and comprehensive lists of priorities with guiding principles for implementation will
help countries aspiring for EU membership to respond better to the EU’s demands and make it
easier for civil society to hold their governments accountable.10 The EU should also include a
date when it believes a candidate country would be ready to join the EU. The date should be used
as a purely preliminary reference poin. The report should read “based on the current assessment,
we expect a country to be ready for membership in 2015.” The EU should revise this given year
with each progress report, moving it up or back if necessary.11
The Western Balkan population generally still supports the EU’s enlargement efforts. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor, 69% think that acceding
to the EU would be a good thing for the country. That figure rose dramatically from 2008, when
48% responded that EU accession was good for their country.12 In both Croatia and Serbia,
support for the EU in 2010 decreased with 25% of Croatians and 44% of Serbians believing that
EU accession would be a good thing compared to 26% of Croatians and 50% of Serbians in
2009.13
The EU needs to better inform and motivate citizens of the Western Balkans in the accession
process. To accomplish this, the EU needs to include and build up civil societies. Civil society
funding needs to be more independent from government and become mutual partners. Currently,
10
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all IPA funding goes through the national governments. A more independent civil society would
make them follow their own agenda and their watchdog role could be strengthened.
In addition, many people involved in the public sector fear losing their jobs when the EU
requires countries to streamline institutions and improve efficiency, and thus do not feel an
urgency in supporting or helping implement reforms. Increasing transparency about the process
of enlargement would clarify what new capacities a country must develop, and could reassure
public sector employees that their support for reforms will benefit them directly.14 Leaders of the
opposition political parties would also be interested to know how EU accession conditions might
help break political machines and reopen electoral competition.
In this thesis I set out to see if the European Union’s enlargement model had a positive effect
in helping build up democracy and the rule of law in the Western Balkans. I focused on the
Component I of Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which is used to strengthen
domestic institutions and the rule of law. Within the first component, I looked at the justice and
home affairs sector within that I assessed whether the measures to address corruption and
minority rights and refugees have been effective. The three Western Balkan states that were
chosen were Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were chosen because each
represented a different stage of accession; they share a geographical footprint, and many
historical experiences.
The results indicate that despite the financial assistance the EU has given towards the
Western Balkans, the countries have a long way to go to improving democracy and the rule of
law. Conditions have not worsened but they have not improved. They have been relatively
14
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99
constant. However, hope is not lost for the EU’s policy in the Balkans. If the EU strengthens and
clarifies its conditionality and only accepts members when they are politically and technically
ready to become EU member states, it will show that the EU is truly committed to enlargement,
and the future of the EU and the Western Balkans will look bright.
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